Why the United States and Its Allies Cannot Simply Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

At firstglance, the problem appears straightforward: if Iran obstructs the Strait of Hormuz, surely the United States and its allies can deploy naval power, clear the route, and restore freedom of navigation. In practice, the situation is far more difficult. The central issue is not whether Washington and its partners can project force into the region. They can. The issue is that reopening the Strait and guaranteeing normal commercial safety are two different things. Even now, after weeks of disruption, a small number of vessels linked to Oman, France, and Japan have been able to pass — but only in what looks increasingly like selective, politically conditioned transit rather than the restoration of ordinary maritime freedom.

The Strait matters because it is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, flows through Hormuz in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 accounted for more than one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade, about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption, and around one-fifth of global LNG trade. Any prolonged disruption there therefore affects not only Gulf exporters, but also Asian importers, shipping markets, insurers, refiners, and ultimately consumers well beyond the Middle East.

Geography is the first reason the Strait cannot simply be “opened” by decree. Reuters reports that any serious military effort to keep Hormuz open would likely require a major and prolonged ground operation along a mountainous coastline against entrenched Iranian forces capable of targeting shipping from far inland. That is a very different proposition from sending a few destroyers into a sea lane. In narrow waters close to an adversary’s coast, the side trying to guarantee transit carries the heavier burden: it must protect commercial traffic continuously, whereas the side trying to disrupt it needs only limited, intermittent success.

That leads to the second problem: Iran does not need to impose a perfect, hermetic blockade to achieve strategic effect. It only needs to make passage appear unpredictable, expensive, or potentially fatal. CSIS noted that before the conflict the Strait was averaging more than 153 vessel transits per day, while subsequent ship-tracking data showed traffic collapsing dramatically. USNI, citing Lloyd’s List, reported an 81 per cent drop in traffic on one March day compared with the previous week, with roughly 200 tankers stranded in the region. In other words, Iran does not need to sink every vessel. It merely needs to raise the perceived level of danger high enough that commercial operators begin to self-deter.

A third difficulty is scale. Escorting a handful of tankers is one thing; escorting enough merchant traffic to restore confidence across the market is another. President Trump signalled in March that the United States might begin escorting tankers through the Strait, but USNI reported that the U.S. Navy had told shipping industry leaders it did not have the naval availability to provide escorts through Hormuz on the required scale. Even when warships are present, that does not mean they can cover every tanker, gas carrier, and container ship at commercially useful frequency. A naval escort can reduce risk for specific voyages, but it cannot instantly normalise the entire corridor.

A fourth constraint is that maritime security is not determined by warships alone. Shipping is a commercial system governed by insurance, chartering decisions, crew risk, routing models, and contractual liability. USNI reported that major shipping companies were already avoiding the Strait because they could not obtain war-risk insurance on acceptable terms. Reuters, citing the EIA, reported on 7 April that even after the Strait reopens, full restoration of flows may take months and that a risk premium is likely to remain in oil prices. This is crucial. Even if allied navies suppress some immediate threats, they cannot force underwriters, shipowners, and crews to behave as though peacetime conditions have returned.

The fifth problem is diplomatic and legal. A broad international mandate for coercive action has not materialised. Reuters reported that a draft U.N. Security Council resolution was watered down after Chinese objections so that it merely encouraged defensive coordination and possible escorting of commercial vessels, rather than authorising force. The Associated Press then reported that Russia and China vetoed even that diluted resolution on 7 April. That does not make unilateral or coalition action impossible, but it does make it politically heavier, more controversial, and more vulnerable to accusations of escalation or illegitimacy.

There is also a strategic asymmetry that favours Tehran. Iran is operating on the logic of controlled disruption, not conventional sea control. Reuters reported that Tehran is now discussing a protocol with Oman that would require permits and licences for passage, while also seeking fees as part of a wider settlement. Whether those proposals are ultimately accepted is another matter. The important point is that Iran is trying to convert a military disruption into a political and administrative filter. That is why a few vessels can pass while the wider system remains impaired: selective access is being used as leverage.

This is why the phrase “ensure safety” is misleading. The United States and its allies can certainly reduce danger, clear some routes, conduct surveillance, organise escorts, and pressure Iran diplomatically. But they cannot honestly guarantee that every vessel will move through Hormuz with the predictability of peacetime commerce unless they are willing to escalate much further — potentially into a prolonged military campaign against a fortified coastal defence system. Reuters also notes that, even if the Strait is reopened, the economic effects will not disappear immediately; the EIA expects disrupted flows and higher prices to linger for months. Reopening the map is easier than restoring confidence.

The real answer, then, is not that the United States and its allies are powerless. It is that they face the wrong kind of problem for a simple show of force to solve. Hormuz is not merely a strip of water. It is a narrow commercial artery under the shadow of geography, missiles, mines, insurance markets, diplomacy, and political signalling. Naval strength can keep some ships moving. It cannot, by itself, make the Strait feel safe again.