The devolution gap is now a £7 billion problem for Glasgow

By Stuart Patrick, Chief Executive, Glasgow Chamber of Commerce

The Prime Minister’s passion for regional devolution is posing an urgent dilemma for Glasgow Chamber of Commerce members. Scotland’s major cities are at risk of falling well behind England’s city regions in both powers and access to investment. How will our major cities compete in the battle for private investment and talent attraction if no agreement is reached between the Scottish and UK Governments on how far city region empowerment should progress in Scotland? 

In March 2014, I attended a Centre for London event launching a pamphlet written by Greg Clark, the urban economist, and Greg Clark, then MP and Minister for Cities in the Cameron government. It was no gimmick: the primary theme was how badly the UK’s economic productivity was affected by the poor performance of the major cities outside London. At that time cities from Birmingham to Glasgow were recording productivity below the national average. In no other major European economy was that the case. It was not only the capital city that performed well – the next largest cities were also exceeding national averages. 

The Clarks argued that instead of treating our cities as problems requiring management from Westminster they should be empowered regionally as engines of national growth. 

At the same time Glasgow City Council was negotiating the first City Deal outside England which secured £1 billion of funding from the UK and Scottish Governments. It was an important moment that brought together the eight local authorities that make up Glasgow City Region to plan the region’s economic growth. 

In November of that same year, Greater Manchester went a step further and agreed to introduce a directly elected mayor in return for powers over regional economic growth including transport, planning, housing and skills. 

Since then Manchester has secured several further devolution agreements culminating in the Trailblazer Devolution Deal which in 2025/26 provided the city region with an annual ‘integrated settlement’ of £630 million.  Manchester can spend that cash on growing its economy as it sees fit. 

Over that same period Glasgow City Region has had much less empowerment.  Yes, there have been several pots of money awarded in addition to the City Deal including a £160m Investment Zone, £43m in an Innovation Accelerator Programme and, most recently, £50m of Local Innovation Partnership funding. Decisions have been made locally to invest that money in growing the region’s advanced manufacturing, life science and digital industries with business leadership consulted on each occasion. 

But notably, Greater Manchester received every one of these investments too. The difference is not simply the amount of funding available, but the greater powers and flexibility Greater Manchester has to determine its own investment priorities and direct resources towards them. There is no doubt that devolution to Greater Manchester – and to other regions including the West Midlands – has moved at a much faster pace than in Glasgow. 

Now Prime Minister Andy Burnham has set up No 10 in the North and is due to announce the details of how a share of income tax receipts will be passed over to England’s city mayors. 

How should Scotland respond ?  Professor Sir Anton Muscatelli, distinguished economist, former Principal of the University of Glasgow and current President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh has made several recommendations arguing that Scotland is one of the most centralised countries in Europe and that more powers should sit with regional partnerships allowing those partnerships to have genuine influence over investment priorities, skills policy, innovation funding and transport infrastructure. He is not alone in making this case. The Centre for Cities has made very similar calls specifically arguing that Glasgow City Region is under-performing by £7 billion per annum on a £50 billion current output. That gap is by far the biggest in Scotland. 

At Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, our focus is on how greater devolution could secure the investment priorities the Chamber’s governing Council has agreed are needed to grow Glasgow’s economy.  Would greater devolution make a difference? The answer is unequivocally yes. Skills provision, regional transport infrastructure and industry cluster growth are all opportunities where it would be easier for local businesses to influence faster and more effective outcomes. 

Many members are persuaded that city devolution is highly relevant to tackling skills shortages. Industries like maritime and construction could be early beneficiaries. Working with colleges, universities and training providers in a regional labour market could be more productive if funding mechanisms including apprenticeship programmes could be influenced by the local business community. 

In transport the delivery of the Clyde Metro could arguably have made much quicker progress - it is now eight years since its first proposal - if it had not had to go through a national strategic prioritisation process and if the region had an improved capacity to design and finance the Metro. 

The development pace for Glasgow’s three university-led industry innovation districts would almost certainly have been quicker with more funds in regional hands. 

That is not to say that national oversight is not important. Industry strategy is best designed nationally but agreement can be reached with national agencies like Scottish Enterprise or Innovate UK on what the greatest strengths are that individual city regions can contribute to each sector. 

How will our major cities compete for private investment and talent if no agreement is reached between the Scottish and UK Governments on how far city-region empowerment should progress in Scotland? 

The good news is that First Minister John Swinney committed last November to enabling legislation that would formalize the Glasgow City Region structures to make it easier to raise finances for projects like the Clyde Metro. That is a helpful step forward. So too is the SNP manifesto commitment for an Urban Development Company for Glasgow. That should add development capacity to help tackle commercial gap funding challenges such as those currently faced by Glasgow City Centre. 

There is, however, an urgent need for the two governments to agree on how additional powers and resources are devolved to city regions. In the absence of that agreement the previous Conservative government often chose to side-step Holyrood. It would be so much better if there was agreement as to how, for example, industry research money, defence investment and welfare-related skills interventions will reach Glasgow City Region from the UK Government. And how skills, transport and industry support funding might be increasingly devolved from Holyrood. In the absence of an agreement, the Glasgow business community will support the Glasgow City Region make its own separate cases wherever opportunities arise. And if English cities become ever more powerful, the Glasgow case will be ever more pressing.

This article was first published in the Herald on 29.07.2026.

America Votes: Democrats Enter the 2026 Midterms Ahead, but the Senate Remains Uncertain

The first clarification is important: the United States holds its midterm elections on Tuesday, 3 November 2026, and, as of 2 November, no official election results have been released. Early voting has been under way for several weeks, but participation figures and opinion polls should not be confused with counted votes. The information currently available therefore indicates the direction of the contest rather than its final outcome.

Voters will decide control of the House of Representatives, the Senate, 36 governorships and thousands of state and local offices. Republicans enter Election Day with narrow majorities of 218–214 in the House and 53–47 in the Senate. Democrats consequently need a net gain of four seats in each chamber. More than 100 million Americans are expected to vote, while political advertising expenditure had already reached a record $3.8 billion by 12 October.

What the Final Polls Suggest

The clearest signal is in the House. A Reuters/Ipsos poll completed on 26 October placed Democrats ahead by 47% to 36% among registered voters. After undecided voters were allocated, the margin narrowed to nine percentage points. The same survey found President Donald Trump’s approval rating at 32%, while 73% of respondents believed that the cost of living was moving in the wrong direction. Democratic voters also reported considerably greater enthusiasm than Republican supporters.

Nate Silver and Eli McKown-Dawson’s FLIPR model gives Democrats approximately a 95% probability of winning the House, with an average projected gain of 25 seats. Silver describes the Senate as more competitive, although the final round of surveys has also moved in the Democrats’ direction. His warning remains relevant: forecast probabilities are not vote shares, and a systematic polling error could still change several close races at once.

The Cook Political Report has reached a similar, though more cautious, conclusion. Its closing analysis describes Democrats as slight favourites for the Senate and projects a Democratic gain of between 12 and 25 House seats. Cook identifies Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Ohio and Texas as Senate contests within the polling margin of error. Kyle Kondik of Sabato’s Crystal Ball says the national political environment has continued to deteriorate for Republicans. His organisation moved 28 House ratings towards the Democrats but still classifies 12 House districts and five Senate races as toss-ups.

“Mr Veto”: What Trump Can—and Cannot—Block if Democrats Win Congress

President Donald Trump has warned that he would become “Mr Veto” if Democrats gain control of Congress in the 3 November midterm elections. Describing how he would respond to legislation passed by a Democratic majority, Trump said: “They’ll be sending stuff up. You veto it.” He added that, after a period of confrontation, the parties would probably have to negotiate: “At some point, we’ll probably make deals.” ndtv.com

The statement is a declaration of political strategy rather than a new legal power. Trump is suggesting that he would use repeated vetoes to prevent a Democratic Congress from reversing his policies and to force its leaders into negotiations. The White House is also reportedly preparing to rely more heavily on executive authority in areas such as tariffs, immigration, federal grants and regulation if Republicans lose control of Congress. Such executive actions would remain subject to statutory limits and judicial review. reuters.com

WESIO International Executive Programmes: Special Trainings for Decision-Makers

Economic development depends on the quality of a country’s workforce, but the effect of skills is not evenly distributed. Decisions made by ministers, senior civil servants, chief executives and directors of state-owned infrastructure companies influence entire sectors, public budgets and investment programmes. When these leaders allocate capital well, negotiate balanced international agreements and introduce suitable technologies, their decisions can raise productivity across thousands of businesses. When they make poor choices, the cost can persist for decades.

This makes the qualified international training of senior decision-makers an economic necessity. Executive competence should be treated as a form of institutional capital: knowledge embedded in the people responsible for converting national resources into functioning infrastructure, competitive industries and investable projects.

The World Bank estimates that approximately 400 million people work in the public sector worldwide. Its research identifies management practices, professional skills and the effective use of digital technologies as major determinants of public-sector performance. The report also finds that many governments provide insufficient training and frequently fail to connect available courses with the actual competencies required for particular positions.

Europe Grows Faster Than Expected, but Inflation Complicates the Recovery

The euro-area economy expanded by 0.4% in the third quarter of 2026, twice the 0.2% growth forecast by economists. Output was 1.3% higher than a year earlier. The figures suggest that European households and businesses continued spending despite expensive energy, weak external demand and geopolitical uncertainty.

Performance varied considerably across the region. Germany recorded quarterly growth of 0.2%, offering some relief after a prolonged period of industrial weakness. Spain and the Netherlands each grew by 0.6%, while Italy’s economy remained unchanged. France contracted by 0.1% amid political uncertainty and concerns over public finances.

The headline figure nevertheless requires some caution. Ireland recorded growth of 5.5%, largely reflecting the volatile activities of multinational corporations. According to an Associated Press analysis, euro-area growth would have been closer to 0.2% without Ireland’s unusually large contribution. Eurostat has also described the current figures as preliminary and subject to revision.

Lagarde is leaving at a point when the ECB must choose between two competing risks

Christine Lagarde has announced that she will leave her position as President of the European Central Bank on 7 February 2027, several months before the formal end of her eight-year term. This is a significant development for Europe’s financial system: the ECB president influences interest rates, the value of the euro, sovereign borrowing costs and access to credit across the 21 countries of the euro area.

There is currently insufficient evidence to suggest that her departure is connected to a scandal, dismissal or an already agreed appointment elsewhere. The confirmed fact is that she intends to leave the ECB early. Reports of a radical career change should therefore be treated cautiously until Lagarde or the ECB provides a fuller explanation and announces her future plans.

The timing makes the decision particularly sensitive. Euro-area inflation reached 3.8% in September 2026, up from 3.2% a month earlier and well above the ECB’s 2% target. Energy inflation rose to 18.9%, while services inflation reached 3.2%. The ECB kept interest rates unchanged but warned that high energy costs continued to create upward pressure on prices.

Economic conditions are equally complex. The euro area grew by 0.4% in the third quarter, exceeding the 0.2% forecast. France, however, recorded a 0.1% contraction, while Italy showed no growth. Higher interest rates could further weaken investment and increase the cost of servicing public debt, particularly in countries already facing pressure on their finances.

Fire Over Novokuibyshevsk: What the Refinery Strike Means for Russia’s Oil Economy

On the morning of 30 October 2026, a major fire broke out at the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Russia’s Samara region following a drone attack. Videos published by local residents showed several columns of thick black smoke rising over the facility. Ukrainian defence company Fire Point said that its long-range FP-1 drones had recorded multiple strikes, including damage to a diesel hydrotreatment unit.

It would, however, be premature to describe the refinery as completely destroyed. Russian authorities confirmed an attack on the Samara region but did not disclose the condition of the plant. At the time of publication, there was no independent assessment of the damage, the likely duration of any shutdown or possible casualties. Even a visually extensive fire does not necessarily mean the loss of the refinery’s entire capacity: the consequences depend on which processing units, power systems, storage facilities and pipelines were damaged.

The Refinery’s Place in Russia’s Oil Industry

The Novokuibyshevsk refinery has belonged to the Rosneft group since 2007 and has operated since 1951. According to Rosneft, its primary distillation capacity is 8.8 million tonnes of crude oil a year, equivalent to 64.35 million barrels. The refinery produces petrol, diesel, aviation fuel, bitumen, petroleum coke, lubricant components and other petroleum products.

The International Energy Agency estimates that Russia has 32 major refineries with combined installed capacity of approximately 6.5 million barrels per day. This is equivalent to roughly 320–325 million tonnes annually. Russia also has smaller and specialised processing facilities, which explains why some national registers report a higher total number of refineries.

DNIPRO STATION STRIKE KILLS AT LEAST 14 AS LOCAL TRUCE HOLDS ELSEWHERE

The attack on a crowded railway platform exposes the narrow limits of the Oleshky humanitarian ceasefire as Ukraine, Russia and the United States prepare for new negotiations

A Russian jet-powered drone struck the main railway station in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on 29 October, hitting a crowded platform where passenger and commuter trains were preparing to depart. At least 14 people were killed and 14 injured, six of them seriously. Later Ukrainian reports placed the death toll at 15. Among those receiving hospital treatment was an 11-year-old boy.

According to Ukrainian Railways, the Dnipro–Zaporizhzhia passenger service was standing at the platform when the drone arrived. Ukraine’s air force said three of four jet-powered drones used in the daytime attack had been intercepted, but the fourth reached the station. Images released by emergency services showed damaged trains, shattered windows and rescuers carrying victims from the platform.

The United Nations condemned the attack and stressed that civilians and civilian infrastructure are protected under international humanitarian law. Railway travel remains essential in Ukraine, transporting civilians, displaced families, aid workers and supplies across a country where commercial aviation has largely ceased.

A Day of Attacks Across Ukraine

Dnipro was one of several Ukrainian cities struck that day. Two 15-year-old girls were killed in central Chernihiv, where the number of injured later rose to 31. Three people died in attacks on residential buildings in Kremenchuk, while a subsequent missile strike killed another person in Kyiv. Russian drones also hit buses in Zaporizhzhia, injuring six people.

The strikes also damaged energy and transport infrastructure. Approximately 350,000 households in and around Dnipro lost electricity, while a second attack set fire to a student residence. The students had reached a shelter before the building was hit.

Ukrainian officials described the attacks as deliberate strikes against civilians. Moscow has repeatedly denied targeting civilians. Determining the legal character of an individual attack requires evidence about the intended target, the intelligence available to those who ordered it and whether the principles of distinction and proportionality were observed.

A Ceasefire in One City, Continued War Elsewhere

The attacks occurred while a six-day humanitarian ceasefire continued to hold around Oleshky, a Russian-occupied city in the southern Kherson region. Ukrainian and Russian teams completed the clearance of mines from agreed routes, allowing a convoy carrying food, water and medical supplies to begin moving towards the city on 30 October.

Around 2,000 people remain in Oleshky, compared with approximately 24,000 before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Many residents are elderly, unwell or unable to leave without assistance. The operation is intended to supply the local hospital and evacuate people who wish to move either to Ukrainian-controlled territory or to Russia.

The Oleshky agreement is a geographically limited humanitarian arrangement. It does not establish a nationwide ceasefire, restrict military operations elsewhere or resolve any of the disputes driving the war. The deaths at Dnipro railway station demonstrate how little protection the local pause offers to civilians beyond its designated area.

Diplomacy Under Fire

Ukrainian, Russian and American representatives are expected to hold technical-level talks in November, potentially in Abu Dhabi or Switzerland. The successful implementation of the Oleshky operation could show that limited agreements are possible when their purpose, territory and monitoring arrangements are clearly defined.

The central political questions remain unresolved. Russia continues to demand Ukrainian territory that it does not fully control, while Ukraine rejects concessions imposed by force and seeks binding security guarantees. Negotiations will also take place amid shortages of Ukrainian air-defence missiles and renewed attacks on the country’s transport and energy systems.

Dnipro and Oleshky now present two sharply different realities of the same war. In one city, Russian and Ukrainian officials have maintained a temporary silence to permit humanitarian assistance. In another, passengers waiting for an ordinary train were killed by a drone.

The Oleshky ceasefire may save lives and provide evidence that practical cooperation remains possible. The attack on Dnipro shows why a local pause cannot be presented as broader de-escalation.

A humanitarian corridor in one occupied city cannot compensate for civilians being killed at a railway station elsewhere.

Israel’s Final Election Results Leave Netanyahu Without a Majority

Likud remains the largest party, but a record result for Arab-led parties has changed the balance of power in the Knesset

Israel’s final election count has confirmed a divided parliament and no immediate path to a stable government. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political alliance finished ahead of its opponents but secured only 53 of the 120 seats in the Knesset—eight fewer than the 61 required for a governing majority.

Netanyahu’s Likud remained the country’s largest party with 27 seats. Gadi Eisenkot’s centrist Yashar party won 21, while the wider opposition bloc received 48 seats. The Joint List and Ra’am, Israel’s two principal Arab-led groupings, secured a combined 19 seats—their strongest result to date. Final turnout reached 77.9%, with more than 5.7 million votes cast.

The result is a serious reversal for Netanyahu’s governing coalition, which previously controlled 68 seats at its peak. Yet it is not a clear victory for the opposition. Eisenkot and his allies remain 13 seats short of a majority unless they reach an agreement with at least some Arab representatives.

Three Possible Routes to Government

Netanyahu’s most direct option is to persuade opposition politicians or entire factions to join his right-wing, religious and ultra-Orthodox alliance. As Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, he has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to divide opposing coalitions. This time, however, he would need at least eight additional members—far more than a small number of individual defections.

A second possibility is an Eisenkot-led administration supported by the Arab parties. Together, the opposition bloc and Arab factions would control 67 seats. The arithmetic works, but the politics are difficult. Yashar and several of its partners campaigned on promises that they would not form a government dependent on Arab parties. Breaking those commitments could provoke resistance inside the opposition and among voters whose attitudes have hardened since the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023.

The third option is a broad unity government bringing Likud together with centrist or secular opposition parties. Such a coalition could command a comfortable majority, but it would require major concessions. Netanyahu might have to separate from some of his far-right and ultra-Orthodox partners, while Eisenkot and his allies would have to abandon their central campaign promise of removing Netanyahu from power.

If all three routes fail, Israel could face another election early in 2027.

Arab Voters Change the Parliamentary Arithmetic

The election’s most consequential result may be the rise of the Joint List and Ra’am from a combined 10 seats in the outgoing parliament to 19 in the new one. Their success means that neither major bloc can easily form a government while excluding the representatives of around one-fifth of Israel’s population.

This influence does not guarantee participation in government. The Joint List has indicated that it could support an alternative administration from outside the coalition, while Ra’am has previous experience as a coalition partner. In 2021, it became the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli governing alliance.

Netanyahu and members of Likud responded to the Arab parties’ result with allegations of electoral fraud and foreign interference. No evidence of systematic fraud has been established. The Central Elections Committee said that circulated claims were unfounded and would not affect the results submitted to the president. Election officials and Israel’s domestic security service also warned against placing collective suspicion on Arab citizens who voted lawfully.

What Happens Next?

The Central Elections Committee is expected to present the official results to President Isaac Herzog on 4 November. Herzog will then consult the parliamentary factions and select the candidate he believes has the best prospect of forming a government. That person does not automatically have to be the leader of the largest party.

Netanyahu will remain caretaker prime minister throughout the negotiations. If the first candidate fails, another can be given the opportunity. The process could last for weeks or even extend beyond two months. The new Knesset is scheduled to be sworn in on 10 November, regardless of whether a governing coalition has been agreed.

The eventual outcome will influence Israel’s military policy in Gaza, its confrontation with Iran, settlement activity in the West Bank and relations with the United States. It will also determine whether the country moves towards a more inclusive political arrangement or returns to the cycle of repeated elections that marked the years before Netanyahu’s previous coalition took office.

Netanyahu has retained the largest political bloc, but he has lost the parliamentary majority that sustained his government. Eisenkot has enough support to challenge him, but not enough to govern independently. Arab-led parties possess unprecedented negotiating power, yet remain politically excluded by many of the partners whose support they could make decisive.

Israel’s voters have redrawn the balance of power. The harder question is whether its political leaders can now turn that result into a government.

Ukraine-Russia War: A Humanitarian Pause in Oleshky, Not a General Ceasefire

A six-day humanitarian ceasefire in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian city of Oleshky has survived its first 30 hours without a reported violation. Ukrainian and Russian human rights officials confirmed that the agreement was being observed, offering a rare pause in a war that continues with full intensity elsewhere.

The ceasefire began at 3 a.m. Kyiv time on 27 October and is scheduled to remain in force until the evening of 1 November. Its purpose is narrowly defined: to clear mined roads, deliver food, drinking water and medicine, restore access to basic medical assistance and evacuate residents who wish to leave.

US First Lady Melania Trump helped to coordinate the agreement through Ukrainian and Russian civilian negotiators. Pope Leo XIV had also spoken with Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin about the humanitarian emergency in Oleshky. The ceasefire area was subsequently expanded beyond the city to provide safe passage for humanitarian convoys within the wider Kherson region, although its precise boundaries have not been publicly disclosed.

A City Cut Off by War

Oleshky lies on the southern bank of the Dnipro River, opposite the Ukrainian-controlled city of Kherson. Russian forces captured it during the opening days of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. The city later suffered extensive flooding following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 and has remained trapped between opposing military positions.

Its pre-war population of approximately 24,000 has fallen to between 1,700 and 2,000 people. Many of those who remain are elderly or have limited mobility; Ukrainian and American estimates suggest that up to 50 children are still in the city. Residents have endured severe shortages of food, medicine, electricity and clean water, while mines and constant drone activity have made ordinary travel extremely dangerous.

The first stage of the humanitarian operation involves engineering reconnaissance and the removal of mines from roads leading into Oleshky. Convoys are then expected to deliver essential supplies and equipment for the local hospital. Ambulances and specialised transport are being arranged for people requiring urgent medical treatment.

Residents will be allowed to decide whether they wish to remain in Oleshky, move to Ukrainian-controlled territory or travel to Russia. Ukrainian officials have said that those choosing Ukraine will be accompanied, received on arrival and offered accommodation. Representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the United States are expected to monitor parts of the mission once the routes have been made safe.

A Humanitarian Pause, Not a General Ceasefire

The agreement must not be mistaken for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. Russian missile and drone attacks have continued in other parts of Ukraine, including Kyiv, while fighting persists along the front. The Oleshky arrangement applies to a designated humanitarian area and does not restrict military operations across the rest of the country.

This distinction matters. A local truce can save lives without changing either side’s military strategy or political demands. Moscow continues to demand control over Ukrainian regions that it claims to have annexed, including territory it does not fully occupy. Kyiv rejects the surrender of its land and insists that any settlement must contain enforceable security guarantees.

Even so, the successful opening of a humanitarian corridor would carry political significance. Previous attempts to suspend fighting have frequently collapsed amid accusations, mistrust and conflicting interpretations of the terms. In Oleshky, Ukrainian and Russian officials are communicating directly, publishing coordinated information and verifying compliance with a written agreement.

A Test Before New Peace Talks

Ukrainian, Russian and American representatives are expected to resume technical-level negotiations during the first half of November, potentially in Abu Dhabi or Switzerland. These discussions would follow months of diplomatic deadlock and are unlikely to resolve the central disputes over territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s military capacity and its future relationship with NATO.

The Oleshky mission therefore represents a limited but practical test. If both sides can protect aid workers, clear roads, deliver supplies and evacuate civilians without exploiting the pause for military advantage, they will have demonstrated that carefully defined agreements can be implemented.

That would not mean peace is close. It would mean that, under intense international scrutiny and for a specific humanitarian purpose, cooperation remains possible.

For the people still living in Oleshky, however, the value of the ceasefire is more immediate. Its success will be measured in bread delivered, patients treated, mines removed and civilians brought to safety—not in diplomatic statements.

In a war dominated by destruction, six days of silence may offer Oleshky something its residents have been denied for years: a safe road out and a chance to survive.

Israel’s Election 2026 Ends in Political Deadlock

Israel’s first national election since the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 has ended without a decisive winner, leaving the country facing weeks of coalition negotiations and possibly another election. The vote was widely treated as a judgement on Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership after three years of war, domestic division and growing international pressure.

With approximately 84.5% of ballot boxes counted, Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc was projected to receive 54 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The opposition grouping led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot stood at 49 seats, while Arab-led parties were projected to win 17. These figures remain provisional, but neither principal bloc is close to the 61 seats required to form a majority government.

Likud remained the largest individual party, winning about one-fifth of the vote. Eisenkot’s centrist Yashar party placed second. Overall turnout reached 77.7%, the highest level in Israel for more than two decades, reflecting the importance voters attached to an election shaped by the failures surrounding 7 October, the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, and the continuing argument over Netanyahu’s responsibility for Israel’s security crisis.