Its origins lie in the post-war settlement of 1945. The UN Charter was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945. The Security Council was created because the founders of the United Nations wanted more than a diplomatic assembly; they wanted a mechanism capable of acting quickly when international peace was under direct threat.
Iran is not placing a barrier across the water. It is building a system of licences, selective access, military pressure and political control that could make passage through Hormuz conditional rather than free.
The Strait of Hormuz cannot be closed with a literal barrier. It is not a canal with a toll booth and it is not a port with gates. Yet Iran is attempting to achieve something close to the same result by different means: turning an international strait into a space where passage depends not only on maritime law, but on political permission, military control and prior coordination with Tehran. That is the real physical meaning of the system Iran is now trying to build.
Reuters reported on 7 April that Tehran wants the right, as part of a broader peace arrangement, to charge ships for transiting Hormuz. According to that report, Iranian officials said the fee would vary depending on the type of vessel, the cargo and the prevailing conditions. Reuters also reported that Iran says it is working with Oman on a protocol under which ships would need permits and licences in order to pass through the strait, although Oman had not publicly confirmed such an agreement at the time.
The failed United Nations vote on the Strait of Hormuz was not simply another procedural clash in New York. It became a test of whether the international system could respond quickly and credibly when one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints was under pressure. It failed that test. On 7 April 2026, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution aimed at coordinating international efforts to protect commercial shipping through Hormuz, despite the fact that the draft had already been weakened in an attempt to make it acceptable to them.
The arithmetic of the vote was politically revealing. Eleven of the Council’s fifteen members voted in favour. Russia and China voted against. Pakistan and Colombia abstained. In any ordinary political forum, that would have been enough to pass the measure. In the Security Council, however, the veto remains the decisive instrument of power, and once it was used, the resolution was finished regardless of how broad the wider support had been.
The war in Ukraine remains the largest land conflict in Europe since the Second World War. According to AP and Reuters, the front line stretches for roughly 1,250 kilometres; Russia continues its spring offensive, while Kyiv, despite isolated counterstrikes and the partial recovery of territory, is still fighting a war of attrition. At the same time, the diplomatic process has not disappeared entirely: Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed his readiness for a limited halt to strikes on energy infrastructure over Orthodox Easter, and Kyiv is expecting new contacts with American mediators after the negotiating track was slowed by the escalation in the Middle East.
The modern world economy is more resilient than it was at the start of the pandemic or during the first energy shock of 2022, but it is not remotely insulated from a new external shock. Its strength lies in the fact that most major central banks entered this crisis with positive interest rates, more policy credibility than in the zero-rate era, and at least some room for targeted fiscal support. Its weakness lies in its continuing dependence on energy prices, maritime logistics, inflation expectations and fragile cross-border confidence. In practical terms, that means the system can absorb another serious shock, but only at the cost of slower growth, stickier inflation and tighter financial conditions.
As of 7 April 2026, the baseline had already deteriorated. World Bank President Ajay Banga said the war in the Middle East would lead to some degree of lower global growth and higher inflation even if the disruption proved relatively short-lived, and he estimated a possible hit to global GDP of roughly 0.3 to 1 percentage point, with inflation rising by as much as 0.9 percentage points depending on the severity and duration of the energy shock. Kristalina Georgieva’s message, as reported by Reuters, was similarly bleak: the direction of travel is towards higher prices and weaker growth.
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