The 18th BRICS Summit opened in New Delhi on 12 September 2026 under India’s official theme, “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The expanded group represents nearly half of the world’s population and a substantial share of global economic activity. Its leaders speak of multilateralism, international cooperation and a stronger voice for the Global South.
Yet behind the ceremonial handshakes and carefully prepared declarations lies a fundamental contradiction: can an organisation credibly demand a fairer international order while embracing a leader whose government has launched a war of aggression against a sovereign neighbour?
BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Handshake the World Cannot Ignore
Russian President arrived in India and held bilateral talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi as Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine continued. The International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Putin over allegations concerning the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. It is important to be legally precise: an arrest warrant is not a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, it represents one of the gravest international legal actions ever taken against the leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
International Criminal Court (ICC) is an intergovernmental organisation and international tribunal seated in The Hague, Netherlands, that investigates and tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community.
The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly described Russia’s actions as aggression against Ukraine and demanded that Russia withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory. In September 2026, the UN again warned that the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the prohibition against changing borders by force cannot be applied selectively according to geography, power or political convenience.
Against that background, every ceremonial photograph and business meeting with Putin carries a political price. For critics, these images do not represent neutral diplomacy. They risk normalising aggression and signalling that access to energy, trade and political influence can outweigh accountability.
BRICS Speaks About International Law—but Selectively
The New Delhi Declaration expressed concern over the escalation in the Middle East, called for restraint and repeated the bloc’s commitment to resolving international disputes through dialogue and diplomacy. It also criticised unilateral sanctions and measures that disrupt international trade.
The language sounds principled. The difficulty lies in its selective application.
BRICS leaders readily invoke the UN Charter when opposing Western sanctions or demanding reform of international institutions. Yet the same collective determination is far less visible when the discussion turns to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A rules-based international system cannot function if every state defends international law only when doing so serves its immediate interests.
Justice cannot be regional, ideological or transactional. If sovereignty protects one BRICS member from foreign intervention, it must also protect Ukraine. If attacks on civilian infrastructure are unacceptable in the Middle East, they must be equally unacceptable in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and every other Ukrainian city. International law either applies to everyone—or it eventually protects no one.
The Economic Price Is Already Being Paid
The BRICS summit is taking place amid severe disruption to global energy markets and maritime trade. Brent crude exceeded $100 per barrel in September as renewed fighting in the Middle East intensified fears over oil supplies. Before the current Iran conflict, the region exported roughly 20 million barrels of crude and petroleum products each day; recent flows have been estimated at approximately half that level.
The consequences extend far beyond petrol stations. Higher oil and gas prices increase transport, food, manufacturing and electricity costs. They intensify inflation, weaken household purchasing power and place pressure on central banks to maintain or raise interest rates.
These costs are particularly significant for major energy importers—including India and China. India’s crude basket reportedly reached almost $116 per barrel on 9 September, placing growing financial pressure on the country’s state-owned fuel companies.
Russia, by contrast, remains a major energy exporter. Higher world prices can increase the value of Russian oil and provide Moscow with additional revenue, although sanctions, price discounts, logistical costs and attacks on Russian energy infrastructure complicate that benefit. The wider point is clear: geopolitical instability can create commercial advantages for producers even as consumers across the Global South pay more.
BRICS countries seeking affordable energy must therefore ask whether deeper dependency on an aggressive and sanctioned power creates genuine security—or merely replaces one form of vulnerability with another.
Russia, Iran and the Expansion of Regional Instability
It would be inaccurate to claim that Russia directly commands Iran, Hezbollah or Yemen’s Houthis. These actors have their own leadership, interests and decision-making structures. However, Russia and Iran have built an extensive strategic partnership involving political, economic, technological and security cooperation.
Iran, in turn, has long supported Hezbollah and the Houthis. In 2026, Iranian-backed Houthi attacks and advances around strategic maritime routes intensified concerns over shipping through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have contributed to the rise in global oil prices.
This network of relationships does not prove that Moscow initiated every regional confrontation. It does demonstrate, however, that cooperation with authoritarian and militarised partners can create interconnected risks: weapons, intelligence, sanctions evasion, energy disruption and political protection begin to reinforce one another.
When states place short-term transactions above legal accountability, they risk creating a deeper layer of opaque, corrupt and potentially criminal relationships. What begins as discounted oil or an alternative payment mechanism can become political dependence.
Iran Exposes the Divisions Within BRICS
The war involving Iran has revealed how limited BRICS unity can be when members’ vital interests collide.
Iran and the United Arab Emirates—both represented within the BRICS framework—have found themselves on opposing sides of the regional conflict. In May 2026, BRICS foreign ministers were unable to agree on a joint communiqué. Iran demanded condemnation of US and Israeli actions, while the UAE rejected Tehran’s allegations and held Iran responsible for attacks against Emirati territory and infrastructure. India was forced to issue a chair’s statement acknowledging the disagreements.
The leaders eventually adopted a joint declaration in New Delhi, but they achieved consensus through language that avoided assigning direct responsibility. This was a diplomatic success for India, but it did not eliminate the underlying conflict.
The contradiction is striking: BRICS presents itself as an emerging centre of global governance, yet it struggles to identify an aggressor even when its own members accuse one another of military attacks.
Expansion Without Shared Principles
Azerbaijan formally applied to join BRICS in August 2024 but remains outside its full membership. No transparent, authoritative evidence identifies one particular country as solely responsible for blocking its admission. However, the unresolved application illustrates a broader problem: expansion depends upon consensus among governments whose strategic relationships and regional interests frequently conflict.
India and China continue to manage a difficult relationship shaped by border tensions and competition for influence. Iran and the UAE have become direct regional rivals. Russia and China often view BRICS as a geopolitical counterweight to the West, while India and Brazil have generally placed greater emphasis on economic cooperation and institutional reform.
BRICS may be expanding geographically, but expansion is not the same as unity. Adding more flags to a summit photograph does not create a common political philosophy.
Business Interests Cannot Replace a Moral Foundation
Economic cooperation is legitimate and necessary. Developing countries are entitled to demand fairer representation within the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other global institutions. BRICS is also correct to challenge double standards wherever they exist.
But one double standard cannot be corrected by creating another.
A bloc that wishes to reshape global governance must offer something stronger than shared dissatisfaction with the West, access to commodities and mechanisms for avoiding sanctions. It must demonstrate that sovereignty, accountability and human dignity apply to allies and rivals alike.
Otherwise, BRICS risks becoming not an alternative international order, but a marketplace in which political protection is exchanged for energy, trade and strategic loyalty.
BRICS Is Not Yet Collapsing—but Its Unity Is Fragile
It would be premature to declare that BRICS has already collapsed. The group has established the New Development Bank, expanded its membership and continues to attract interest from other governments. Its members also succeeded in negotiating a joint declaration in New Delhi despite serious disagreements.
New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by the BRICS states as an alternative to the existing American and European-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
But the summit shows that BRICS is fracturing in plain sight.
Its members do not share a unified position on Iran, Ukraine, relations with the West or even the organisation’s fundamental purpose. They are united most clearly by economic opportunity and a desire for greater global influence. Those interests may sustain regular summits, but they may not be sufficient to build a durable international institution.
Business interests can bring governments to the same table. They cannot, by themselves, create trust, legitimacy or justice.
The real question is therefore no longer simply “BRICS or not to BRICS?”
The real question is what price countries will ultimately pay for doing business without principles—and whether an organisation that refuses to hold aggression accountable can ever build the fairer world order it claims to represent.
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