Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian data centres have opened a new front in modern warfare. Instead of targeting only oil refineries, ammunition depots and military factories, Ukraine has begun striking infrastructure that supports Russia’s cloud computing, artificial intelligence, banking systems, communications and digital economy.
The attacks have produced genuine disruption. However, the widely circulated claim that they eliminated 60%—or even 90%—of Russian bot activity requires careful examination. Available evidence shows that Russia conducts extensive foreign influence operations, but it does not yet prove that the damaged data centres controlled most Russian political bots or enabled Moscow to “manage” foreign elections directly.
How Many Data Centres Does Russia Have?
There is no single definitive figure because different databases use different definitions. Some count only large commercial colocation facilities, while others include corporate server centres, cloud availability zones, telecommunications facilities, cryptocurrency infrastructure and projects still under construction.
One specialist database identified 102 verified Russian facilities in October 2026, including 80 operational centres, eight under construction and 14 planned. Broader industry estimates count more than 200 facilities, while Cloudscene-based research places the total at approximately 251 data centres. DC Market Insights
The difference is therefore methodological rather than necessarily contradictory. A single data-centre campus can contain several independent buildings, and a cloud “availability zone” may operate across more than one physical location. At the same time, many banks, telecommunications companies and technology businesses operate private facilities that are not fully disclosed for commercial or security reasons.
Russia’s commercial capacity is heavily concentrated in Moscow, the surrounding regions and St Petersburg. Industry estimates indicate that between 80% and 90% of commercial data-centre capacity is located in the European part of Russia. The leading operators include Rostelecom Data Centres, IXcellerate, Rosatom’s Atomdata, DataPro and Selectel, which together control a substantial share of the market. ixcellerate.com
Yandex, VK and Russia’s Digital Giants
Before the October 2026 attacks, the core Yandex ecosystem reportedly depended upon six major data centres. Three were seriously damaged during successive Ukrainian strikes: two were shut down completely, while several modules at a third facility were put out of operation. ft.com
The affected infrastructure supported considerably more than the Yandex search engine. It hosted cloud services, payment systems, email, taxi and food-delivery applications, business databases and digital services used by thousands of external customers. Yandex Cloud reportedly served approximately 64,000 customers by mid-2026, although the company did not disclose how many were affected. therecord.media
VK’s infrastructure is more difficult to express as a single number. VK reported that it operated four geographical data-centre clusters in 2025, but clusters and individual buildings are not the same thing. The company has operated its own facilities, including the Pakhra centre near Moscow, while also leasing capacity from other providers around Moscow and St Petersburg. A VK data centre in the Leningrad region was reportedly struck by a drone on 18 October 2026.
Other important infrastructure belongs to or supports Sberbank, Rostelecom, MTS, MegaFon, Selectel, DataPro, Rosatom and major online retailers. A Ukrainian drone strike also hit a large Sberbank data-centre project that was expected to host one of Russia’s largest supercomputers. reuters.com
What Happens When a Data Centre Is Attacked?
A modern data centre depends on several interconnected systems: electricity, backup generators, cooling equipment, telecommunications links, storage hardware and specialised technical personnel. Destroying or disabling only one of these elements can force an entire facility to suspend operations.
The immediate consequences may include:
- cloud-service interruptions;
- inaccessible websites and applications;
- payment and banking failures;
- disruption of transport and delivery services;
- loss of access to corporate databases;
- interruption of AI and computing workloads;
- migration of services to alternative providers;
- possible permanent loss of data without functioning backups.
The effects can spread far beyond the damaged building because thousands of businesses may depend on the same cloud provider. Following the Yandex attacks, Russian users reported problems with payments, taxi services, websites and other everyday digital systems. Services in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Belarus were also reportedly affected. ft.com
Nevertheless, cloud systems are specifically designed to survive individual failures. Properly configured workloads can be transferred to other centres or providers. This means that an attack can create serious disruption without permanently destroying the affected digital operation.
Did Russian Bot Activity Really Fall by 60%?
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly stated that after the attack on Yandex, 60% of online activity originating from Russian users and directed against Israel disappeared. This is an important political statement, but it should not be misquoted as proof that 60% of all Russian bot farms worldwide were destroyed. The publicly reported remarks did not disclose the measurement method, platforms examined, time period or criteria used to distinguish bots from genuine users. newsukraine.rbc.ua
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also suggested that the strikes were followed by a noticeable reduction in hostile messages, manufactured division and automated activity. Yet independent analysts found that some of the most dramatic viral claims confused Yandex search-engine crawlers with political propaganda bots. Web crawlers are automated systems that index internet pages; their disappearance does not demonstrate the destruction of a foreign influence network. theguardian.com
Cloud-based bot operations can also migrate rapidly. Subsequent analysis indicated that suspicious automated traffic moved from Yandex infrastructure to alternative Russian providers. One assessment found that political bot interactions declined by only approximately 5.7%, while other categories of malicious automated activity remained broadly stable. tomshardware.com
Therefore, the defensible conclusion is that the strikes probably disrupted some automated systems and may have temporarily affected particular influence operations. They did not demonstrably eliminate the majority of Russia’s global propaganda infrastructure.
Russia and Foreign Elections
The broader evidence of Russian interference in democratic information environments is much stronger. US intelligence agencies have repeatedly identified Russia as a leading foreign influence threat. In 2024, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency attributed fabricated election-related videos to Russian influence actors. The US Department of Justice separately disrupted a Russian government-sponsored operation using false websites, influencers, paid advertising, AI-generated material and social-media accounts. fbi.gov
American intelligence also assessed that Russia produced more AI-generated content intended to influence the 2024 US presidential election than any other foreign state. This activity sought to amplify social divisions, undermine confidence in democratic institutions and favour political outcomes considered beneficial to Moscow. reuters.com
In Germany, researchers identified Russian-linked networks spreading fabricated stories and promoting the far-right Alternative for Germany while attacking mainstream parties and weakening public support for Ukraine. These campaigns benefited the political environment surrounding AfD leader Alice Weidel, but this does not prove that every supportive account, like or rising poll figure was created by Russia. Political popularity, domestic grievances, platform algorithms and foreign amplification can operate simultaneously. reuters.com
The correct distinction is between electoral influence and electoral control. Russia has demonstrably attempted to manipulate political discussion, promote preferred narratives and deepen divisions. That is not the same as proving that Moscow changed ballot totals, falsified official election results or single-handedly determined who won.
The Strategic and Ethical Question
Data centres have become dual-use infrastructure. The same facility may support civilian banking, transport and medical services while also hosting government systems, AI development, military contractors or coordinated influence operations. This makes them strategically important but also creates serious humanitarian and legal concerns when civilian services depend on them.
The strikes have revealed a central weakness in Russia’s digital model: despite the language of a decentralised “sovereign internet”, a large proportion of essential services remains concentrated among a relatively small number of state-aligned technology companies and facilities.
Ukraine’s attacks have therefore achieved more than temporary technical disruption. They have exposed the physical foundations of Russia’s digital power. But the claim that destroying several data centres automatically neutralises Russian election interference is too simple. Influence operations are distributed across commercial clouds, private contractors, compromised devices, residential proxy networks, social-media accounts and infrastructure outside Russia.
Russia possesses approximately 100 clearly documented major facilities and potentially more than 250 data centres under broader counting methods. Yandex operated six central facilities before three were seriously damaged, while VK reported four geographical clusters and also relied on leased infrastructure.The attacks caused real and far-reaching disruption. Netanyahu’s reported 60% figure suggests that some Russian-origin hostile activity targeting Israel may have fallen sharply, but it is not yet an independently verified measurement of global bot-farm capacity.
The evidence does support a wider conclusion: Russia systematically uses bots, artificial intelligence, false media outlets and coordinated social-media networks to influence political discourse abroad. However, responsible analysis must distinguish established interference operations from unproven claims that every unpopular political movement, manipulated like or election result is controlled from a Yandex server.
The data-centre strikes have illuminated the machinery behind Russia’s digital ecosystem—but they have not yet revealed the entire architecture of its global influence operations.