Ukrainian drones have issued “sanctions” to the Tuapse oil depots for the 3rd time this month — this is how Ukrainian sources and military commentators describe the latest series of strikes.
According to Reuters, the confirmed attack on 28 April was at least the third strike on Tuapse in less than two weeks, while the Tuapse refinery had already halted operations after the 16 April attack due to damage to port infrastructure and the inability to ship products.
“Fire Sanctions”: How Ukrainian Drones Are Methodically Targeting Russia’s Oil Economy
Russia’s war against Ukraine has long gone beyond the front line. Every day, Russian missiles, aerial bombs and drones attack Ukrainian cities, energy facilities, residential buildings, hospitals, railways and civilian infrastructure. In response, Ukraine is increasingly using long-range drones against the part of the Russian economy that directly fuels the war: oil refining, oil depots, export terminals, ports and pipeline infrastructure.
These strikes are increasingly being called “fire sanctions.” Unlike Western sanctions, which pass through diplomatic procedures, financial restrictions and political negotiations, Ukrainian drones act quickly and precisely: they disable storage tanks, primary refining units, port terminals, pumping stations and export hubs. Their purpose is not symbolic but economic: to reduce the fuel capacity of the Russian army, complicate exports of oil and petroleum products, and increase the aggressor’s costs for repairs, security, logistics and insurance.
Oil is the central artery of Russia’s war economy. Reuters has described oil production as the “lifeblood” of Russia’s economy, worth around $3 trillion, while Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil exporters. When refining facilities or export ports stop operating, the effect is felt not only at a single plant, but also in the budget, logistics, military fuel supply, domestic petrol market and international trade.
Ukraine’s logic is clear: if Russia uses oil revenues to finance the war, then oil infrastructure becomes part of the war machine. Strikes on refineries and oil depots are therefore not chaotic revenge, but a systematic campaign of pressure on the aggressor’s resource base.
Reuters, citing a Ukrainian government source, reported that the primary goal of the campaign is to create shortages of key fuels, including petrol and diesel, inside Russia, making it harder for Moscow to sustain its offensive at the front.
Tuapse: The Export Refinery That Became a Symbol of Vulnerability
The Tuapse refinery is one of the clearest examples of this campaign. It is located on the Black Sea and is primarily export-oriented. According to Reuters, the facility has a capacity of around 12 million tonnes per year, or approximately 240,000 barrels per day; it produces diesel, fuel oil and vacuum gas oil.
After the attack on 16 April 2026, the plant stopped operating. The reason was not only damage to the facility itself, but also damage to port infrastructure: a fire at the port made it impossible to ship products. Reuters also reported that the attacks on 16 and 20 April damaged transport infrastructure at the port and caused fires at petroleum product storage sites.
A new strike took place on 28 April, causing a major fire. Reuters reported that it was the third strike on the Black Sea port in less than two weeks. According to the agency, the plant had already been out of operation after previous attacks, while damage was preventing product shipments; authorities evacuated residents from nearby areas because of smoke.
From a military and economic point of view, Tuapse is important for several reasons. First, it is an export hub. Second, it is linked to the processing and shipment of products that generate foreign currency revenue. Third, repeated strikes show that even if an object is partially restored, it remains under threat, meaning insurance, logistics, repairs and security become increasingly expensive.
Ust-Luga: A Strike on the Baltic Export Corridor
Another key target is Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea. It is one of Russia’s most important port and energy complexes, through which export flows pass. According to Reuters, in March 2026 Ukrainian drones struck an oil terminal in Ust-Luga; Ukraine’s Security Service said there was “serious damage” and a fire.
Reuters also reported that Ukrainian drones again damaged the port of Ust-Luga at the end of March, while sources indicated that an oil terminal had been hit. The importance of this target lies in the fact that it is not simply a fuel storage site, but part of the export system: when such hubs are damaged, Russia may still produce oil but faces problems refining, storing and exporting it.
Such strikes are especially painful when combined with attacks on other ports — Primorsk, Novorossiysk, Sheskharis — and pipeline infrastructure. Reuters has listed among the affected sites the Sheskharis oil terminal, damage at the Primorsk terminal, facilities in the Samara region and a number of refineries in different regions of Russia.
The Ukrainian long-range strike campaign is no longer limited to border regions. The list of affected or temporarily halted facilities includes Syzran, Novokuibyshevsk, Tuapse, the Nizhny Novgorod NORSI refinery, Kirishi, Ust-Luga, Ufa, Saratov, the Ilsky refinery, Volgograd, Ukhta, the Afipsky refinery, Sheskharis, Primorsk and other oil infrastructure sites.
The Syzran refinery suspended processing after attacks on 18 April; its capacity is around 8.5 million tonnes per year, or 170,000 barrels per day. The Novokuibyshevsk refinery halted primary processing after the 18 April attack. Tuapse stopped after the 16 April attack. NORSI, Russia’s fourth-largest refinery and second-largest petrol producer, suspended operations on 5 April; its capacity is around 16 million tonnes per year, or 320,000 barrels per day. Ust-Luga halted gas condensate processing and naphtha exports after a fire. The Saratov refinery kept a primary distillation unit shut after a 21 March strike. The Volgograd refinery was stopped on 11 February; the strike hit, among other things, the CDU-1 unit, which accounts for about 40% of the plant’s capacity.
These are no longer isolated episodes. They form a map of systematic pressure on oil refining and export logistics.
According to Reuters calculations, strikes on various Russian refineries in August 2025 disabled around 17% of Russia’s oil refining capacity, or 1.2 million barrels per day; by the end of the month, that share had risen to 21%, or 1.4 million barrels per day.
In another estimate, Reuters reported that strikes on 10 plants disrupted at least 17% of Russia’s refining capacity, or around 1.1 million barrels per day.
Later, Reuters reported that Russia tried to offset the damage through spare capacity: at the peak of the second wave of strikes from August to October, attacks and scheduled maintenance took about 20% of refining capacity offline, but the actual decline in refining volumes was around 6%, to roughly 5.1 million barrels per day — about 300,000 barrels per day below the previous year’s level. For January–October, refining fell by around 3%, to about 220 million tonnes, or 5.2 million barrels per day.
This is an important detail: Ukraine does not always instantly “collapse” the entire sector, because Russia has spare capacity and repair capabilities. But constant strikes create a cumulative effect: plants stand idle, repair costs rise, export opportunities shrink, shortages of certain fuels emerge, and the system is forced to operate in emergency mode.
Falling Production and Export Problems
The most sensitive indicator is no longer only refining, but also production. Reuters reported that in April 2026 Russia was forced to cut oil production due to Ukrainian attacks on ports and refineries, as well as the halt of supplies through the remaining pipeline to Europe. According to five sources and Reuters calculations, production may have fallen by 300,000–400,000 barrels per day compared with the average level in the first months of the year; this could be the sharpest monthly decline in six years.
The export logic is obvious. If terminals are damaged, refineries halted, pipelines not operating and storage facilities burning, oil becomes harder to place on the market. One Reuters source stated directly that, amid attacks on ports and refineries, Russia would find it difficult to place oil without cutting production, especially given spring maintenance.
Thus, “fire sanctions” hit not only refining, but the entire chain: production — transportation — refining — storage — port — export.
Material Damage: Billions of Dollars
Damage estimates vary because Russia has classified part of its oil statistics and companies do not disclose the real extent of damage. But indirect estimates already show the scale.
The Moscow Times, citing Kommersant and the insurance market, reported that Russian oil companies suffered more than 1 trillion roubles, or around $12.9 billion, in losses as a result of the Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian refineries in 2025. Direct damage to the oil and gas sector from drone attacks was estimated at more than 100 billion roubles, while total losses including lost profits and indirect costs exceeded 1 trillion roubles.
Such losses consist of several parts: destroyed storage tanks, damaged primary refining units, repairs to port infrastructure, plant downtime, lost export revenue, additional spending on air defence and security, higher insurance premiums, rerouted transport, tanker delays, idle staff time and contract disruptions.
For the oil industry, the danger is not only the fire itself. The danger is repetition. If an object burns once, it is an accident. If it burns several times in one month, it becomes a new operational reality in which every shipment, every repair and every tanker becomes risky.
Strikes on refineries also affect Russia’s domestic market. Reuters reported that after the attacks, domestic petrol prices in Russia rose by about one tenth, while queues appeared at some petrol stations.
Reuters also reported that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said long-range strikes may have cut petrol supplies in Russia by up to one fifth. This is a Ukrainian estimate, but it reflects the political logic of the campaign: to hit not only export revenues, but also Russia’s ability to supply its domestic market with fuel without disruption.
Even if Russia compensates for some losses through spare capacity, such compensation is not free. Restarting old units, repairing damaged nodes, accelerating logistics and redirecting flows increase costs and reduce the flexibility of the industry.
Why Russia Cannot Fully Protect Its Oil Infrastructure
Russia’s oil system is enormous and geographically stretched. Refineries, terminals, pumping stations, pipelines, storage parks and ports are located hundreds and thousands of kilometres apart. It is impossible to protect everything.
Reuters noted that the frequency of Ukrainian attacks has become the highest since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, while the range and payload of drones are increasing. Reuters also reported that since the beginning of August 2025, Ukraine had launched at least 58 attacks on key Russian energy sites, with drones reaching targets up to 2,000 kilometres inside Russian territory, according to Open Source Centre data.
This changes the balance. Russia once considered its deep rear safe. Now the oil industry from the Baltic to the Volga region and the Black Sea is forced to live under constant threat.
The Economic Meaning of “Fire Sanctions”
Classical sanctions work through bans, price caps, technology restrictions, banking operations and insurance. Ukrainian strikes work differently: they physically reduce the availability of the infrastructure on which Russian exports depend.
Their effect can be divided into five levels.
The first is direct physical damage: burnt storage tanks, damaged units, destroyed berths.
The second is production downtime: a plant stops, products are not made, contracts are not fulfilled.
The third is logistical disruption: oil and petroleum products cannot be quickly shipped, tankers move to other ports, routes become longer.
The fourth is financial pressure: repairs, insurance, security, compensation and lost profits.
The fifth is strategic effect: Russia is forced to spend resources defending the rear, not only the front.
That is why strikes on refineries and ports cannot be assessed only by the size of a single fire. What matters more is how they disrupt the entire production-export cycle.
Limitations of This Strategy
Despite the effectiveness of Ukraine’s campaign, its limitations must also be understood. Russia remains a major oil exporter, has large reserves, repair capabilities and can redistribute flows. Reuters noted that Russia was able to mitigate the consequences of strikes by using spare capacity and returning damaged units to operation after repairs.
In addition, high global oil prices can partly compensate for lower volumes. Reuters reported that Russia’s potential losses from reduced production in April could have been softened by higher prices linked to the war around Iran and the global supply crisis.
But this does not cancel the main point: Russia is being forced to adapt not to a one-off strike, but to a new permanent threat. And the more often refineries burn, the more expensive the war becomes for the Russian budget.
Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine and strikes civilian infrastructure every day. Ukraine, lacking equal access to long-range missile systems at the beginning of the war and facing restrictions from allies, created its own long-range drone industry. Now this industry is striking the aggressor’s economic nodes.
That is why the term “fire sanctions” has become more than a vivid metaphor. It reflects a new type of asymmetric pressure: Ukraine cannot stop the entire Russian oil industry with a single decision, but it can methodically turn it into a costly, vulnerable and unstable system.
Ukrainian drones are no longer merely demonstrating their ability to reach Russian targets. They are changing the economics of war. Tuapse, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Syzran, Novokuibyshevsk, Volgograd, Saratov, NORSI, Afipsky and other facilities show that Russia’s oil infrastructure is no longer untouchable.
According to Reuters estimates, strikes disabled up to 17–21% of Russia’s oil refining capacity during certain periods, Russia was forced to reduce production in April by 300,000–400,000 barrels per day, and total losses in the oil and gas sector from Ukrainian strikes in 2025 were estimated at more than 1 trillion roubles, including direct damage, lost profits and indirect losses.
Russia wanted to make war a daily reality of fear, destruction and loss for Ukraine. Ukraine is responding by making war a daily reality for the Russian oil industry — the very industry that finances aggression.
And if ordinary sanctions can be bypassed through intermediaries, tankers, schemes and shadow markets, “fire sanctions” leave behind something impossible to hide: flames above storage tanks, stopped refineries, empty shipment schedules and an increasingly expensive price of war for the aggressor.