Could the pursuit of national independence leave the British Isles—and Europe—less secure?
OPINION: Stuart Robinson
This article explores a hypothetical scenario set in 2035. It is an opinion piece, not a prediction of events.
Imagine the year is 2035. The United States has withdrawn from NATO, Russia has seized further Ukrainian territory, and Europe is struggling to defend itself without the military power upon which it relied for generations.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is an intergovernmental military alliance of North American and European countries, established to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.
European governments are urgently increasing defence expenditure and attempting to strengthen the continent’s remaining nuclear deterrent. France and the United Kingdom once provided Europe with two independent nuclear capabilities. But by 2035, in this imagined future, the United Kingdom no longer exists.
Scotland and Wales have become independent republics, while Northern Ireland has joined the Republic of Ireland. The political objective of self-determination has been achieved—but its consequences are proving far more complex than the slogans suggested.
Self-determination is the right of a people to determine its own political status and pursue its own economic, social, and cultural development.
A Nuclear-Free Ideal in a Nuclear-Armed World
The governments of Ireland, Scotland and Wales declare that the British Isles must become a nuclear-free zone. They demand the closure of Faslane, formerly the home of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, and reject the permanent deployment of nuclear weapons within their territories.
Morally, such a position may sound appealing. Few people wish to live under the shadow of nuclear war. Yet nuclear disarmament by one side does not automatically produce disarmament by its adversaries.
Russia retains its nuclear arsenal. Other authoritarian powers continue expanding their military capabilities. Europe, already deprived of the American security guarantee, suddenly loses the British nuclear deterrent as well. France is left as the European continent’s only nuclear-armed state within this hypothetical security order.
The central question is unavoidable: does removing a deterrent make war less likely—or does it make aggression less costly?
A nuclear-free British Isles might become a powerful moral statement. It might also create a dangerous strategic vacuum at precisely the moment Europe can least afford one.
Who Pays for Independence?
Independence is frequently presented as freedom from distant government. But sovereignty is not simply a flag, a parliament and a national anthem. It carries responsibilities.
An independent state must finance its own defence, protect its borders, maintain intelligence services, secure territorial waters and airspace, participate in international alliances and prepare for emergencies. These duties cannot be outsourced indefinitely to a neighbouring country.
In this imagined future, Ireland, Scotland and Wales maintain comparatively modest defence budgets while expecting England and continental Europe to undertake much of the strategic burden. Yet England, reduced in territory, population, tax base and military reach, can no longer perform the international role previously carried out by the United Kingdom.
The uncomfortable lesson is that political independence without strategic capability can create dependency of another kind.
What Happens to Britain’s Global Responsibilities?
The dissolution of the United Kingdom would not affect only the four home nations. It could also have serious consequences for British Overseas Territories, Commonwealth partners and communities that have historically depended upon British humanitarian or military assistance.
Imagine a catastrophic hurricane striking Caribbean territories. Local people request emergency assistance, but the former Royal Navy no longer possesses the same fleet, logistical network or global operational capacity. The newly independent states have smaller armed forces focused primarily on their own territories, while England has sold or retired much of its ocean-going capability.
Now consider the Falkland Islands. Their inhabitants have repeatedly expressed a clear preference to remain British. If the state responsible for their defence no longer possesses the ability—or the political will—to protect them, what becomes of their own right to self-determination?
Those who champion national self-determination in Scotland, Wales and Ireland must apply the same principle consistently. It cannot be considered sacred for some nations and negotiable for smaller or more distant communities.
The same concern applies to Antarctica. A weakened British successor state might struggle to defend environmental protections, scientific interests and territorial responsibilities against more powerful countries seeking minerals and other strategic resources.
A Smaller Voice at the United Nations
The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Its dissolution would create an unprecedented constitutional and diplomatic dispute over state succession, international obligations and the future of that permanent seat.
United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, charged with ensuring international peace and security.
It should not be assumed that the seat would simply disappear or automatically transfer to another country. England, or a successor state continuing the United Kingdom’s international legal identity, might seek to retain it. Other governments could challenge that position.
Whatever the legal outcome, prolonged uncertainty could weaken the influence of liberal European democracies within the Security Council. At a time of intensifying global competition, fragmentation might produce additional flags and delegations—but less combined diplomatic power.
More representation does not necessarily mean more influence.
The Northern Irish Paradox
Irish reunification would not automatically resolve Northern Ireland’s historic divisions. It could merely reverse their political direction.
Many former nationalists might become supporters of the new Irish union, while former unionists could begin demanding autonomy, federalism or even a separate Northern Irish state. Those who once defended government from Westminster might find themselves opposing government from Dublin.
Changing a border does not instantly change identity. Nor does it erase mistrust, economic inequality or competing historical memories.
A successful united Ireland would therefore require more than a referendum victory. It would need constitutional guarantees, power-sharing arrangements, cultural protection and the genuine consent of communities that continue to identify as British.
Otherwise, reunification could exchange one constitutional grievance for another.
Independence Within Europe
Supporters of Scottish and Welsh independence often argue that their countries could regain sovereignty while joining—or rejoining—the European Union. This is a legitimate political proposition, but it carries an obvious tension.
Membership of the European Union involves pooling authority over trade, regulation, competition, borders and other areas. That arrangement may be economically and politically beneficial, but it is not unlimited sovereignty.
Scotland could leave a union in which its citizens directly elected MPs to Westminster, only to enter another political structure in which it would be one relatively small member among many. Wales would face similar choices.
This does not invalidate independence. It does, however, mean that the debate must move beyond romantic language. The relevant question is not whether power will be shared, but where it will be shared, under what conditions and with how much influence.
Self-Determination Must Include Responsibility
Every nation has the right to discuss its constitutional future. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should not be forbidden from debating independence or reunification. Democracy requires peaceful political choice.
But self-determination cannot mean considering only what a nation wishes to escape. It must also involve an honest assessment of the obligations it is prepared to assume.
Who will defend the country? Who will fund its armed forces? Who will protect its territorial waters, energy infrastructure and communications networks? What happens to pensions, currency, debt, intelligence sharing, nuclear security and international treaties? How will minority communities be protected? What responsibilities will the new state accept beyond its own borders?
Without credible answers, independence risks becoming an emotional destination without a practical map.
The Security Britain Takes for Granted
The United Kingdom is imperfect. Its political system requires reform, and its constituent nations possess legitimate grievances. Westminster has too often appeared remote, centralised and unresponsive.
Yet the Union also provides combined military strength, diplomatic influence, economic scale, intelligence capabilities and an ability to respond to international crises. These advantages are often invisible precisely because they have existed for so long.
Breaking them apart would be relatively easy compared with rebuilding them afterwards.
In the most dangerous version of this hypothetical future, Scottish, Welsh and Irish soldiers are eventually called to defend NATO’s eastern frontier. They find themselves fighting a war made more likely by the disappearance of the deterrence they once rejected.
Would they feel more sovereign while depending upon other countries for protection? Would independence feel triumphant if their nations had gained flags but lost security, influence and strategic power?
Independence at Any Price Is Not Freedom
National independence may be valuable when it gives people more democratic control, stronger institutions and a better future. But independence that produces military vulnerability, economic dependency and diminished international influence is not automatically progress.
The question is therefore not simply whether Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland possess the right to choose a different constitutional future. They do.
The real question is whether separation would make their people safer, more prosperous and more influential—or whether it would leave every nation of the former United Kingdom smaller, weaker and more exposed.
In an interconnected and increasingly dangerous world, sovereignty cannot be measured only by the number of national flags. It must be measured by a country’s capacity to protect its people, fulfil its responsibilities and contribute to the security of others.
Independence that destroys collective strength may ultimately prove to be independence in name alone.
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