What the World Economy Faces After the Iranian Crisis

The Iranian crisis has already moved beyond the category of a regional security shock. Even if the acute military phase begins to ease, the world economy is unlikely to return quickly to its previous equilibrium. World Bank President Ajay Banga said the conflict would mean some combination of slower growth and higher inflation even under a relatively short disruption, while IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva warned that the broad direction of travel is towards higher prices and weaker growth.

The immediate transmission mechanism is energy. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints: roughly 20 million barrels per day moved through it in 2024, and bypass pipeline capacity is only a fraction of that volume. In the current shock, Reuters reported physical crude prices near record highs around $150 a barrel for some grades, while broader benchmark prices moved sharply above $110. That matters because even a partial and temporary disruption changes refinery economics, freight pricing, and inflation expectations across the global system.

An Analysis of Scenarios for the Outbreak of a Third World War After the Expiry of the Ultimatum on 7 April 2026

As of 7 April 2026, the world had not yet entered a Third World War, but it had reached a point at which a regional conflict could shift into a qualitatively new phase. US President Donald Trump demanded that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz by the evening of 7 April, Washington time, threatening otherwise to launch large-scale strikes against infrastructure. Iran rejected the ultimatum, insisting not on a temporary ceasefire but on a complete halt to the strikes, guarantees that they would not be repeated, and compensation for the damage. At the same time, Russia and China blocked even a watered-down UN Security Council resolution on protecting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran had already struck the Saudi petrochemical complex at Jubail. All this means that, after the deadline expired, the crisis entered a phase in which the cost of error rose sharply.

The main question is this: does that automatically mean the beginning of a Third World War? Not yet. But it is already the sort of crisis in which one additional step could transform a limited war into a multi-layered international confrontation. What makes the situation especially dangerous is that this is not merely a dispute over territory; it concerns control over the Strait of Hormuz, a route through which, in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025, more than a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, around one fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption, and roughly one fifth of global LNG trade passed. Alternative export routes out of the Gulf are limited to approximately 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day, meaning that they cannot fully replace Hormuz. 

The First Scenario: Severe but Still Limited Regional War

Why the United States and Its Allies Cannot Simply Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

At first glance, the problem appears straightforward: if Iran obstructs the Strait of Hormuz, surely the United States and its allies can deploy naval power, clear the route, and restore freedom of navigation. In practice, the situation is far more difficult. The central issue is not whether Washington and its partners can project force into the region. They can. The issue is that reopening the Strait and guaranteeing normal commercial safety are two different things. Even now, after weeks of disruption, a small number of vessels linked to Oman, France, and Japan have been able to pass — but only in what looks increasingly like selective, politically conditioned transit rather than the restoration of ordinary maritime freedom.

The Strait matters because it is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, flows through Hormuz in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 accounted for more than one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade, about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption, and around one-fifth of global LNG trade. Any prolonged disruption there therefore affects not only Gulf exporters, but also Asian importers, shipping markets, insurers, refiners, and ultimately consumers well beyond the Middle East.

How Does Iran Block the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is often imagined as a place that can be “closed” by a single order, as though it were a gate. In reality, Iran does not block it with a physical barrier or by imposing a total, uninterrupted blockade across the entire waterway. Rather, it creates a military, insurance, and political environment in which the passage of ships becomes either too dangerous or selectively permitted only on Iranian terms.

The reason this instrument works at all lies in geography. The Strait of Hormuz links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, separating Iran from Oman. It is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Tankers move through a narrow, predictable corridor, and in its tightest section the traffic lanes are extremely limited. That makes shipping movements highly exposed and relatively easy to monitor, threaten, delay, or disrupt.

For precisely that reason, Iran does not need to seal the Strait completely. It is enough to destroy the sense of safe transit. When tankers move slowly, along fixed routes, and through a confined passage, even a limited number of attacks, threats, or suspicions of mining can sharply alter the behaviour of insurers, shipowners, charterers, and captains. In such circumstances, the commercial route remains technically open, yet functionally unstable.