WASHINGTON, September 17, 2026 — The United States Congress has completed passage of one of its most consequential Russia sanctions packages in years, sending the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 to President Donald Trump.
There is an important correction to some of the headlines circulating on September 17: the Senate did not pass the bill today. The Senate approved it on August 7, 2026, by an unusually large bipartisan margin of 86–11, with three senators not voting. The decisive final congressional step came on September 16, when the House of Representatives voted 262–159 to accept the Senate amendments. Twelve House members did not vote.
That House vote means the legislation has now cleared both chambers of Congress and is being sent to President Trump.
How strong was the congressional vote?
The numbers are significant. In the 100-member U.S. Senate, the bill passed:
86 in favour
11 against
3 not voting
The Senate vote therefore demonstrated support considerably beyond a simple majority and included members of both major parties.
In the House, the final vote was:
262 in favour
159 against
12 not voting
According to the official House Clerk, the 262 votes in favour consisted of 203 Republicans, 58 Democrats and one independent. Seven Republicans and 152 Democrats voted against the measure.
The House has 435 voting seats under federal law. In addition, five territorial delegates and Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner serve in the chamber but do not have the same voting rights on final passage, bringing the broader House membership structure to 441 positions.
The September 16 roll call accounted for 433 voting members — 421 casting a yea or nay and 12 listed as not voting — indicating vacancies among the 435 voting seats at the time of the vote.
Lindsey Graham's final major legislative project
The measure bears the name of the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who had spent more than a year building a bipartisan coalition for tougher economic pressure on Russia.
Graham died unexpectedly in July 2026, shortly after returning from Ukraine. Before his death, he had been negotiating directly with the Trump administration over the final structure of the sanctions legislation. Senate colleagues later said Graham had reached an agreement with the White House that helped clear the political path for the bill to move forward.
That White House agreement was important. The administration formally announced in July that it supported the Senate version of the legislation and said that, if presented in that form, the President's advisers would recommend that Trump sign it.
Graham therefore did not live to see the final congressional vote, but much of the coalition and compromise behind the bill had been assembled before his death.
Who carried the bill across the finish line?
The legislation cannot accurately be attributed to one politician alone.
Graham's principal Democratic partner was Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, who worked with him on the bipartisan sanctions initiative and continued pushing the measure after Graham's death. Following the House vote, Blumenthal publicly welcomed its final congressional passage.
Graham's sister, Senator Darline Graham, who was appointed to complete her brother's Senate term after his death, also became an advocate for completing his unfinished legislation. After the Senate vote she specifically credited President Trump as well as Senators Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, Jeanne Shaheen and Roger Wicker with helping secure passage.
Senator Katie Britt of Alabama was another prominent Republican advocate and worked to maintain support for the legislation through the Senate and subsequent House process.
In the House, Representative Michael McCaul of Texas played a leading role alongside Democratic Representative Steny Hoyer of Maryland, creating another bipartisan partnership behind the legislation. McCaul described himself and Hoyer as House champions of the measure.
House Speaker Mike Johnson also backed the sanctions measure and supported bringing it to a final vote.
Outside Congress, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly urged American lawmakers to adopt the package.
Perhaps most importantly for its political viability, the Trump administration itself ultimately became a supporter of the negotiated bill. The White House even opposed an amendment by Senator Rand Paul that would have removed the new tariff authorities, arguing that those powers were an important part of the President's leverage in negotiations with Russia.
So the final passage resulted from an unusual coalition: Graham and Blumenthal's original bipartisan effort, Graham's negotiations with Trump, continued work by senators including Darline Graham, Britt, Shaheen and Wicker, and a bipartisan House effort led in part by McCaul and Hoyer.
What does the Graham Act actually do?
The measure is much broader than a conventional list of sanctions against a few individuals.
Economic sanctions are commercial and financial penalties applied by one or more countries against a targeted self-governing state, group, or individual.
Its official text creates a substantial sanctions framework aimed at Russia's political leadership, banking system, energy sector, defence-related entities and sanctions-evasion networks. It also contains provisions aimed at Russia's so-called shadow fleet — vessels and associated actors used to transport energy while avoiding existing restrictions.
Among the most important provisions are restrictions involving Russian government officials and associated individuals; sanctions against specified Russian financial institutions and state-controlled entities; restrictions on U.S. investment in Russia; restrictions relating to Russia's energy sector, sovereign debt and uranium; and measures targeting financial and maritime networks used to evade sanctions.
But the provisions attracting the greatest international attention are the tariff powers.
Up to 500% tariffs on Russian goods
Section 112 directs the President, within 30 days after enactment, to increase duties on goods imported directly from Russia — including oil, natural gas, LNG, petroleum products, petrochemicals and coal — to a rate of up to 500%. These duties would be imposed in addition to other applicable tariffs or charges.
Up to 100% tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy
Even more consequential internationally is Section 113.
It authorises duties of up to 100% on goods entering the United States from countries that continue qualifying purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas, including countries among the largest purchasers, as defined by the legislation. It also targets countries facilitating sanctions evasion.
Tariff is a tax imposed by the government of a country or by a supranational union on imports or exports of goods.
This is why the legislation potentially matters far beyond Russia itself.
Countries with large energy-trading relationships with Russia — particularly major Asian energy importers — could face a choice between continuing certain Russian energy purchases and maintaining favourable access to the American market.
Exactly which countries are affected, however, will depend on statutory definitions, purchasing patterns and decisions taken by the U.S. administration.
Is the 100% tariff automatic?
Not in the simple sense sometimes suggested by headlines.
The legislation creates a statutory obligation to establish the tariff mechanism, but it gives the executive branch substantial discretion over the actual tariff rate, which can be set at a level up to 100%.
The U.S. Trade Representative can subsequently modify rates according to whether a country significantly increases or decreases its major purchases of Russian energy.
This distinction is crucial.
The legislation gives Washington a potentially very powerful economic instrument, but it does not mean that every major purchaser of Russian oil will automatically face a 100% tariff on the first day.
Can Trump simply refuse to use the law?
This is where the Act becomes particularly interesting.
If Trump signs it, the legislation is not merely symbolic. Much of its language uses the word “shall”, requiring presidential action within specified periods. For example, Section 112 states that the President shall increase duties on Russian goods within 30 days, while Section 113 establishes duties against qualifying countries within the same general timeframe.
At the same time, Congress deliberately preserved considerable presidential flexibility.
Section 115 gives the President authority to waive sanctions, restrictions or duties. To do so, however, the President must provide Congress with a written certification that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States, together with a report explaining the basis for that conclusion.
The administration itself highlighted this provision when endorsing the bill, describing it as preserving presidential discretion over waivers.
There is therefore an important difference between saying that Trump can “ignore” the Act and saying that he has broad discretion in implementing it.
He could not simply erase a statute after signing it. But the legislation gives the executive substantial control over tariff levels, determinations, exemptions and national-interest waivers.
That means its practical economic force will depend heavily on how aggressively the Trump administration chooses to use the tools Congress has provided.
Can Trump still stop the bill before it becomes law?
Yes — constitutionally, he still has that power until enactment.
Because Congress has completed passage, the bill goes to the President. Trump can sign it, veto it, or in certain circumstances take no action.
Veto is the power to unilaterally stop an official action, especially the enactment of legislation.
Under Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, a presidential veto can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate.
The previous Senate vote of 86–11 comfortably exceeded two-thirds.
The House vote is different. Of the 421 representatives who voted yea or nay, 262 supported the legislation — approximately 62.2%, below the two-thirds level that would have been required to override a veto with the same turnout and voting pattern.
That does not mean a hypothetical veto could not be overridden; lawmakers could vote differently on an override. But the September 16 House roll call by itself did not demonstrate a two-thirds pro-bill majority.
A veto, however, currently appears inconsistent with the administration's published position. The White House formally supported the negotiated Senate text and stated that presidential advisers would recommend that Trump sign it. As of September 17, reports continued to say that his signature was expected.
As of this writing on September 17, I have not found an official White House notice confirming that Trump has already signed H.R. 5334.
What happens if Trump simply does nothing?
The Constitution provides another important mechanism.
Once a bill is formally presented to the President, he normally has 10 days, excluding Sundays, to act. If he neither signs nor vetoes it and Congress remains able to receive a veto, the measure can become law without his signature.
If Congress adjourns in circumstances that prevent return of the bill during that period, the President can potentially use what is known as a pocket veto.
The precise timing therefore depends on when the enrolled legislation is formally presented to the White House and the congressional adjournment situation.
Could the sanctions later be terminated?
Yes, under specified conditions.
Section 117 allows the President to terminate relevant Russia-related sanctions and duties after reporting to Congress and making statutory certifications. For Russia itself, the legislation specifically refers to a peace agreement accepted by the free and independent government of Ukraine and the cessation of Russian military hostilities and efforts to overthrow or subvert the Ukrainian government.
Most of the Russia-related division also contains a five-year sunset. The Iran provision is treated separately: the Act extends the Iran Sanctions Act from 2026 through 2031.
What could this mean for the wider world?
The immediate significance is not that a new tariff wall has already appeared overnight. It is that Congress is giving the U.S. presidency a larger statutory toolkit for putting economic pressure not only on Russia but also on third countries whose trade helps sustain Russian energy revenues.
Supporters of the Act argue that this creates additional leverage to push Moscow toward negotiations and makes sanctions evasion more expensive. That is the position expressed by Graham's allies, members of the Senate coalition and the Trump administration.
The possible global effects, however, run in several directions.
If the tariff authorities are used aggressively, major purchasers of Russian energy could face strong incentives to diversify their supplies. That could reduce Russian export revenues, change global oil and gas trading patterns and increase the cost of sanctions avoidance.
At the same time, critics have warned that broad secondary tariffs can produce trade disputes with countries that are also important U.S. partners and may affect energy prices or supply chains. Some Democrats who opposed the final House bill argued that Congress was transferring very broad tariff authority to the President.
The ultimate international impact will therefore depend less on the maximum numbers written into the Act — 500% and 100% — than on how those authorities are actually exercised.
Symbolic legislation or a real instrument?
The answer is: legally substantial, but operationally flexible.
It is substantial because Congress has written mandatory sanctions mechanisms, financial restrictions and tariff authorities into federal law rather than relying entirely on temporary presidential policy.
It is flexible because Congress simultaneously gave the President significant power over rates, determinations, waivers and eventual termination.
That combination helps explain why the bill attracted such broad Senate support and why the Trump administration agreed to support it: Congress establishes a stronger sanctions architecture while leaving the President considerable room to use that architecture as an instrument of diplomacy and economic pressure.
For Lindsey Graham, the legislation became the culmination of more than a year of work that he did not live to see completed. For Congress, the September 16 House vote completed the legislative stage. For Donald Trump, the next decision is whether to turn that congressional mandate into law — and, if he does, how forcefully to use the powers it gives him.
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