1) Sudden change of power and an RF elite “chain reaction”
In the event of the sudden incapacity or death of the president, the prime minister would automatically become acting head of state. Elections would need to be held within three months, and the interim leader would face restricted powers (for example, no ability to dissolve parliament or initiate constitutional changes). This would trigger fierce competition among key power groups — the Security Council, security services, the presidential administration and regional elites — to control the transition. The recent appointment of Sergei Shoigu as Secretary of the Security Council strengthens that institution’s role in any succession process. A rapid “elite compromise” could emerge to stabilise the situation, possibly leading to a frozen front line.
2) Consolidation of power and a “North Korean turn”
Further tightening of the vertical of power — including the rolling back of direct mayoral elections, strengthened propaganda, a command economy and deeper ties with North Korea — points to a trajectory of “fortress Russia”. This would mean a protracted low-intensity war and a closure of political channels for compromise, mirroring elements of Pyongyang’s model.
3) Economic shock and a shift of authority towards the security services
If Russia’s economy continues to weaken under sanctions and the burden of war expenditure (estimated at about 6–7% of GDP), security structures such as the FSB and Rosgvardiya may assume broader managerial roles. From direct control of assets to political arbitration, these institutions could enforce a “managed freeze” of the conflict on Moscow’s terms, albeit at the price of deeper international isolation and prolonged stagnation. Rosgvardiya’s access to heavy weaponry in recent years underscores its growing role in domestic stabilisation.
4) Elite bargaining and a frozen conflict without a formal peace
With both sides exhausted and limited by battlefield stalemates, an arrangement to halt hostilities without a final peace treaty remains plausible. This would resemble other “frozen conflicts”: protracted negotiations, external mediators, verification mechanisms and phased sanctions relief in exchange for compliance.
5) A long war of attrition
The most likely scenario in the absence of shocks: the front line shifts little, “artillery economics” and mobilisation budgets sustain fighting, while political costs are spread over time. This would prolong the conflict with no clear conclusion.
6) Escalation with a risk of direct NATO–Russia confrontation (low probability, high cost)
Moscow continues to use nuclear rhetoric and “signals of risk” as tools of coercion. Miscalculations or accidental clashes could trigger crises requiring emergency “off-ramps” to prevent uncontrolled escalation. The probability is low, but the potential damage immense.
Early warning indicators
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Key personnel changes in the Security Council or Presidential Administration that redistribute power.
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Further centralisation measures, such as restricting regional autonomy and removing local electoral mechanisms.
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War finances: rising budget deficits, military expenditure near 7% of GDP, and inflationary pressures.
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Resource build-up by security agencies, including public exercises and procurement of heavy equipment.
Conclusion
The shortest paths to an end are either elite bargaining leading to a frozen conflict, or a sudden break caused by a force-majeure at the top. Yet the trend towards centralisation and a mobilisation economy makes a long war of attrition the statistically most resilient outcome in the near term. Any de-escalation would require both internal incentives for elites and external guarantees.