Methodology. The analysis looks not at “cultures” but at institutional and industrial blocs: on one side, the democratic alliances (NATO/G7), on the other, the authoritarian bloc (Russia–North Korea–Iran, with China in a more ambiguous position). Key drivers of escalation timelines include the pace of ammunition production, budgetary choices, and elites’ tolerance of risk.
September 2025 – March 2026: Moscow’s “window of pressure” (high risk of local escalations)
Russia retains an advantage in ammunition thanks to its own production capacities and large-scale deliveries from North Korea (reportedly millions of shells), while the US and EU have yet to reach their announced output targets. This creates incentives for intensified strikes and provocations on NATO’s periphery.
April – December 2026: resource parity (moderate risk)
By late 2025, the EU expects to reach production of around 2 million 155-mm shells annually, while the US aims for 100,000 per month by mid-2026. Once stockpiles are replenished, artillery parity emerges, reducing incentives for major offensives and shifting the focus to air defence, electronic warfare and long-range systems.
2027–2029: consolidation of a Western “war economy” (moderately low risk of direct NATO–Russia war, high risk of hybrid crises)
The UK commits to 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027 and invests in a new network of arms factories; Poland boosts shell production fivefold; Germany expands troop numbers in line with NATO’s new requirements. This gradually shifts the balance of power. In response, the authoritarian bloc intensifies grey-zone tactics — cyberattacks, energy blackmail and influence operations.
2030–2035: NATO’s structural superiority (low risk of a major European war, rising global frictions)
NATO has set a benchmark of at least 3.5% of GDP for core defence by 2035, and 5% in the broader “security economy” framework. For many members, this means multiple increases in military budgets and industrial output. The likelihood of a direct Russia–NATO confrontation in Europe declines, but the probability of conflict flashpoints in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific grows.
Scenarios of China’s Involvement in the Conflict
1) US–China economic war spirals into security confrontation
Escalating trade restrictions, tech embargoes and financial sanctions may push Beijing into closer alignment with Moscow, including indirect support in arms or logistics. This scenario would intensify bloc confrontation without necessarily leading to direct Chinese military involvement.
2) Taiwan crisis as a trigger
A Chinese move against Taiwan — ranging from blockade to full-scale invasion — would radically shift global dynamics. The US and its allies would be forced to allocate resources to the Indo-Pacific, creating a two-theatre challenge. Russia could exploit this diversion to press harder in Europe, while China would become de facto part of the wider confrontation.
3) Hybrid engagement without direct intervention
China may prefer a “grey-zone” strategy: cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, selective military exports and covert financing. This allows Beijing to weaken the West without crossing the threshold into open war.
How timelines can shift
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Russia’s war economy: Defence spending at 7% of GDP or more could bring forward the escalation window by forcing rapid decisions in Moscow.
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Western production targets: Delays in EU or US output prolong Russia’s artillery advantage; on-schedule delivery produces parity as early as 2026.
China’s calculus: If US–China relations deteriorate sharply, the probability of a dual-front conflict rises significantly by the late 2020s.
Probabilistic scale for the next 18 months (as of September 2025)
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Local escalations and infrastructure strikes: High probability.
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Direct Russia–NATO conflict: Low probability, but extremely high cost.
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Frozen conflict without formal peace: Moderate probability once parity sets in.
China’s direct military involvement: Low in the short term, but medium risk by 2027–2030 under a Taiwan scenario.
Editorial note
Talk of “civilisational conflict” often masks what is essentially an industrial and budgetary race. In reality, escalation timelines are determined by who can sustain stable flows of ammunition, air defence systems and logistics — and whether a China–US rupture creates a second theatre that reshapes the global balance.