In spring 2026, it would be naïve to speak of clear “winners” from global instability in any moral or strategic sense. Wars, sanctions, shipping disruption and energy shocks are making the world economy poorer, more fragmented and more expensive to navigate. Reuters Breakingviews put it bluntly: it is delusional to think any country can emerge as a clean winner from the Iran-related energy crisis. Yet economics is rarely symmetrical. Even when the system as a whole suffers, some countries benefit temporarily through stronger commodity revenues, safe-haven flows, defence demand, rerouted trade, or strategic relevance. The real question is therefore not who is “winning” in absolute terms, but which countries are gaining relative advantages while others come under greater strain.
The first obvious group consists of energy exporters. The World Bank said in April that energy exporters in Europe and Central Asia were likely to benefit temporarily from higher commodity prices, even as most countries in the region would face greater fiscal and current-account pressure. Reuters also reported that the IMF sees oil exporters in Latin America — especially Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela — as short-term beneficiaries of the current shock through stronger export earnings and improved public finances, even though those gains are partly offset by higher domestic fuel and food costs.
Russia is an especially controversial example. It is not a clean winner, because it continues to face sanctions, infrastructure damage and deep strategic constraints. Reuters reported that Russian oil output may struggle to rise much further because of damage to ports and energy infrastructure. But Russia still benefits from one brutal fact of the current global system: when oil and energy prices rise, large commodity exporters gain time, fiscal breathing room and extra geopolitical weight. Even temporary sanctions relief on Russian seaborne oil, granted after countries affected by Hormuz disruption pressed Washington to ease shortages, shows how instability can restore bargaining power to sanctioned producers when global supply tightens.
The Gulf states form a second group, though with important differences between them. Reuters reported that the IMF has sharply cut growth forecasts for the Middle East and North Africa and expects several Gulf economies — including Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar — to contract in 2026 because of the direct impact of the war. Yet Reuters also noted that Saudi Arabia is expected to fare better than others in the region. This illustrates a crucial distinction: countries with stronger fiscal cushions, greater spare capacity, broader state control over strategic sectors and more diversified economic structures are better positioned to convert instability into relative strength. The United Arab Emirates stands out here not because it is untouched, but because it is seen by Washington itself as a systemically important financial and commercial partner; Reuters reported that U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said both the UAE and the United States would benefit from a dollar swap line. That is a sign of strategic financial relevance, and in an unstable world, relevance itself is an asset.
A third category includes countries that benefit not through oil, but through rerouted trade and logistical substitution. Reuters reported that in Africa a few states such as Nigeria and Mozambique could gain from higher oil and LNG prices, while rerouted transport is already increasing traffic through the port of Maputo in Mozambique, Durban in South Africa, Walvis Bay in Namibia and Mauritius. This is an important reminder that instability does not only reward raw commodity exporters. It can also reward transport corridors, ports and jurisdictions that become more useful when older routes are blocked, sanctioned or deemed unsafe.
A fourth set of relative winners consists of safe-haven financial centres and countries with reserve-currency advantages. The United States remains the clearest case. Even when it is politically entangled in the crisis, global instability still tends to support demand for dollars, U.S. Treasuries and U.S.-centred financial arrangements. Reuters reported that several Gulf and Asian allies asked for swap lines from Washington to stabilise dollar funding and avoid disorderly sales of U.S. assets. That dynamic says something profound about the hierarchy of the current system: instability often strengthens the country at the centre of global finance, even when it weakens the wider global economy.
Gold-linked and resource-sensitive economies can also benefit indirectly through safe-haven demand. Reuters reported that South Africa’s rand gained with support from a 1% rise in gold prices during the latest bout of uncertainty. That does not mean South Africa is broadly insulated from global turmoil; it is not. But it does show that countries connected to safe-haven commodities can gain relative support in financial markets even while the broader emerging-market complex comes under pressure.
Asia presents a more mixed picture. As a region, it is more exposed than advantaged because it depends heavily on Middle Eastern energy. But some parts of Asia still emerge as relative winners. Reuters reported that China’s solar panel exports reached a record high in March, driven partly by energy insecurity linked to the Middle East conflict and redirected trade flows elsewhere. That suggests China is benefiting in at least one important sector: the global shift towards energy substitution and resilience. In other words, countries with scale in renewables, energy equipment, strategic manufacturing and industrial substitution may gain from instability even if their broader macroeconomic exposure remains significant.
There is also a geopolitical class of beneficiaries: countries whose strategic importance increases when the system becomes more dangerous. The UAE is one example in finance and trade. Saudi Arabia is another in energy. Turkey, despite its own inflation and currency fragilities, remains strategically relevant because it sits between regions, routes and security blocs. Even when such countries do not become richer in a simple sense, they can gain negotiating leverage, diplomatic visibility and external support. In unstable systems, influence is often a form of economic capital. This last point is an inference based on current Reuters reporting on swap lines, rate expectations and regional positioning.
The countries that seem to benefit most today therefore fall into five overlapping categories: energy exporters, rerouted logistics hubs, safe-haven financial centres, strategic commodity producers, and states whose geopolitical centrality has increased. But every one of these gains is conditional. Higher oil prices help exporters until demand destruction becomes too severe. Port and trade diversions help logistics hubs until routes normalise or new bottlenecks appear. Dollar strength and safe-haven inflows help financial centres, but they also expose the rest of the world to tighter conditions and weaker growth. Even Reuters’ reporting on Latin America makes this clear: Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela may benefit from better export prices, but they still face higher domestic inflation and broader economic stress.
The sober conclusion is that global instability is not really creating winners so much as redistributing advantage. Countries with oil, gas, gold, alternative trade routes, reserve-currency access or strategic diplomatic value can gain relative strength while the rest of the system absorbs higher costs. Today, the clearest relative beneficiaries include the United States, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Mozambique, and a handful of transport or commodity-linked states such as Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa. But these are not triumphs in a healthy world economy. They are advantages extracted from a more fractured, more inflationary and more unequal one.