MINIBOSS BUSINESS SCHOOL Franchise

MINIBOSS BUSINESS SCHOOL Franchise
International Business Academy Consortium

Sunday, 14 September 2025

Forecast of Timelines for Military Escalation between “Civilisational Models”

Methodology. The analysis looks not at “cultures” but at institutional and industrial blocs: on one side, the democratic alliances (NATO/G7), on the other, the authoritarian bloc (Russia–North Korea–Iran, with China in a more ambiguous position). Key drivers of escalation timelines include the pace of ammunition production, budgetary choices, and elites’ tolerance of risk.

September 2025 – March 2026: Moscow’s “window of pressure” (high risk of local escalations)

Russia retains an advantage in ammunition thanks to its own production capacities and large-scale deliveries from North Korea (reportedly millions of shells), while the US and EU have yet to reach their announced output targets. This creates incentives for intensified strikes and provocations on NATO’s periphery.

April – December 2026: resource parity (moderate risk)

By late 2025, the EU expects to reach production of around 2 million 155-mm shells annually, while the US aims for 100,000 per month by mid-2026. Once stockpiles are replenished, artillery parity emerges, reducing incentives for major offensives and shifting the focus to air defence, electronic warfare and long-range systems.

2027–2029: consolidation of a Western “war economy” (moderately low risk of direct NATO–Russia war, high risk of hybrid crises)

The UK commits to 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027 and invests in a new network of arms factories; Poland boosts shell production fivefold; Germany expands troop numbers in line with NATO’s new requirements. This gradually shifts the balance of power. In response, the authoritarian bloc intensifies grey-zone tactics — cyberattacks, energy blackmail and influence operations.

2030–2035: NATO’s structural superiority (low risk of a major European war, rising global frictions)

NATO has set a benchmark of at least 3.5% of GDP for core defence by 2035, and 5% in the broader “security economy” framework. For many members, this means multiple increases in military budgets and industrial output. The likelihood of a direct Russia–NATO confrontation in Europe declines, but the probability of conflict flashpoints in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific grows.

Scenarios of China’s Involvement in the Conflict

Saturday, 13 September 2025

Possible Scenarios for the End of the War




1) Sudden change of power and an RF elite “chain reaction”

In the event of the sudden incapacity or death of the president, the prime minister would automatically become acting head of state. Elections would need to be held within three months, and the interim leader would face restricted powers (for example, no ability to dissolve parliament or initiate constitutional changes). This would trigger fierce competition among key power groups — the Security Council, security services, the presidential administration and regional elites — to control the transition. The recent appointment of Sergei Shoigu as Secretary of the Security Council strengthens that institution’s role in any succession process. A rapid “elite compromise” could emerge to stabilise the situation, possibly leading to a frozen front line.

2) Consolidation of power and a “North Korean turn”

Further tightening of the vertical of power — including the rolling back of direct mayoral elections, strengthened propaganda, a command economy and deeper ties with North Korea — points to a trajectory of “fortress Russia”. This would mean a protracted low-intensity war and a closure of political channels for compromise, mirroring elements of Pyongyang’s model.

3) Economic shock and a shift of authority towards the security services

Friday, 12 September 2025

Blood Falls: A Century-Old Antarctic Enigma Unveiled

Introduction

Blood Falls is a mysterious natural phenomenon in East Antarctica that still evokes a captivating mix of scientific interest and eerie strangeness. A stream of blood-red water flows out from under the Taylor Glacier and spills onto the icy surface of Lake Bonney. First observed more than a century ago, it remains one of the most fascinating subjects of polar research.

Geographical Location

 Coordinates of Blood Falls: approx. 77°42′60″ S, 162°15′60″ E (decimal: −77.7167, 162.2667).

  • Located on the western edge of Lake Bonney in Taylor Valley, one of the McMurdo Dry Valleys — a unique ice desert in Victoria Land.
  • Taylor Glacier itself extends some 54 km from the Victoria Land plateau to the western end of the valley.  

Discovery and Research History

  1. Discovery (1911)
    The falls were first described by Australian geologist Thomas Griffith Taylor during the Terra Nova Expedition (British Antarctic Expedition, 1910–1913, led by Robert Falcon Scott). He noticed a “blood-like” stain at the base of the glacier, which was later named after him.

  2. Early Hypotheses
    Initially, researchers thought the red colour came from red algae. Later chemical analysis proved that the effect was due to iron oxides — essentially rust, formed as iron-rich brine oxidised on contact with air.

  3. Subglacial Reservoir Discovery
    In 2009, geomicrobiologist Jill Mikucki and her colleagues confirmed the existence of highly saline, iron-rich, anoxic (oxygen-free) water feeding Blood Falls. They also discovered microorganisms capable of metabolising sulfur and iron without light or oxygen.

  4. Hydrological Mapping and Modern Methods
    In 2017, a team led by Jessica Badgeley and Erin Pettit, with scientists from the University of Alaska and Colorado College, used radio-echo sounding to trace the hidden path of subglacial water. They revealed that the brine reservoir connects directly to Blood Falls, solving a 100-year mystery about the water’s origin and movement.

Key Scientific Facts

Business Markets at the Edge of Economic and Political Turbulence


As the world edges towards heightened geopolitical confrontation and economic uncertainty, business markets are entering a new and complex phase. Investors, corporates and policymakers are simultaneously contending with disrupted supply chains, inflationary pressures, technological competition and the prospect of tighter regulation. What emerges is not a uniform crisis, but rather a mosaic of risks and opportunities that will define global commerce for the coming decade.

Financial Markets: Risk Appetite Shrinks

Equities have demonstrated increasing volatility in response to global tensions. Investors are shifting away from high-growth technology and speculative assets towards defensive sectors such as healthcare, utilities and defence. Central banks, particularly the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, are navigating a delicate balance between curbing inflation and sustaining economic growth.

Government bonds are once again attractive, serving as safe havens amidst turbulence. Yet persistent fiscal deficits in many advanced economies raise questions about long-term debt sustainability. Currency markets, meanwhile, are reflecting political realities: the dollar remains resilient, the euro is pressured by energy insecurity, and emerging market currencies are highly sensitive to capital outflows.

Energy and Commodities: Supply Insecurity Persists

Energy markets remain structurally fragile. The push for diversification away from Russian energy, combined with the uncertain trajectory of China’s demand, has driven sharp price fluctuations in oil and natural gas. Renewable energy investment is accelerating across Europe and the UK, yet infrastructure bottlenecks and supply chain constraints limit rapid scaling.

In commodities, agricultural markets remain exposed to climatic shocks, while metals such as lithium and rare earths are increasingly politicised as strategic resources for the green transition. Businesses dependent on these inputs face both cost volatility and geopolitical risk.

Technology and Supply Chains: Strategic Realignments

Technology markets are now as much geopolitical as they are commercial. The US–China rivalry has accelerated decoupling in semiconductors, cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Western firms are reconsidering exposure to Chinese supply chains, while Beijing is investing heavily in domestic capacity.

This decoupling creates costs in the short term — higher prices, fragmented standards — but also spurs innovation in alternative markets, including South-East Asia and India. For businesses, the strategic imperative is resilience rather than just efficiency: multiple suppliers, regional diversification and digital security are now as critical as cost control.

Labour and Consumer Trends: Confidence Under Pressure