Methodology. The analysis looks not at “cultures” but at institutional and industrial blocs: on one side, the democratic alliances (NATO/G7), on the other, the authoritarian bloc (Russia–North Korea–Iran, with China in a more ambiguous position). Key drivers of escalation timelines include the pace of ammunition production, budgetary choices, and elites’ tolerance of risk.
September 2025 – March 2026: Moscow’s “window of pressure” (high risk of local escalations)
Russia retains an advantage in ammunition thanks to its own production capacities and large-scale deliveries from North Korea (reportedly millions of shells), while the US and EU have yet to reach their announced output targets. This creates incentives for intensified strikes and provocations on NATO’s periphery.
April – December 2026: resource parity (moderate risk)
By late 2025, the EU expects to reach production of around 2 million 155-mm shells annually, while the US aims for 100,000 per month by mid-2026. Once stockpiles are replenished, artillery parity emerges, reducing incentives for major offensives and shifting the focus to air defence, electronic warfare and long-range systems.
2027–2029: consolidation of a Western “war economy” (moderately low risk of direct NATO–Russia war, high risk of hybrid crises)
The UK commits to 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027 and invests in a new network of arms factories; Poland boosts shell production fivefold; Germany expands troop numbers in line with NATO’s new requirements. This gradually shifts the balance of power. In response, the authoritarian bloc intensifies grey-zone tactics — cyberattacks, energy blackmail and influence operations.
2030–2035: NATO’s structural superiority (low risk of a major European war, rising global frictions)
NATO has set a benchmark of at least 3.5% of GDP for core defence by 2035, and 5% in the broader “security economy” framework. For many members, this means multiple increases in military budgets and industrial output. The likelihood of a direct Russia–NATO confrontation in Europe declines, but the probability of conflict flashpoints in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific grows.