How Did Russia Steal Ukrainian History — and Why?
How Was the Name “Rus” Stolen from Ukraine?
Who Are the “Russian People”?
Author: Olga Azarova
(Read in Ukrainian) (Read in Russian)
MYTHS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
Ukraine has always been a separate, independent, powerful and developed state — one of the first on the territory of Europe to demonstrate a high level of culture, statehood, political organisation, science and education. When Ukraine — then Kyivan Rus — was flourishing politically, economically and scientifically, Russia — then Muscovy — did not yet physically exist.
The occupation of Ukrainian territory in Crimea by Russian troops under the pretext of “protecting” the Russian-speaking population, great-power chauvinism and open fascism prompted me to recall the myths of Russian history that Soviet and later Russian textbooks so diligently hammered into the immature minds of schoolchildren. Many elderly people still live within this historical fiction — these myths. In order to perceive, evaluate and analyse everything adequately, one must know the truth.
There are many blank spots in Russian history, and history has been rewritten many times; whole chapters have been burned out of it and replaced with invented historical facts. But the time has come to debunk these myths and no longer allow our history and our lands to be stolen.
Myths of the Russian Historical Tradition: How the Imperial Narrative about Rus, Ukraine and Russia Was Formed
The history of Eastern Europe is not only a field of academic research, but also a space of political competition. This is especially true of the legacy of Kyivan Rus, the name Rus, and the historical relationship between Kyiv, Muscovy, Lithuania, Poland, the Cossack Hetmanate and the Russian Empire. In the Russian imperial, Soviet and modern state tradition, the idea of an uninterrupted historical line has often been used: Kyivan Rus → the Principality of Moscow → the Russian Empire → the USSR → the Russian Federation.
From an academic point of view, this linear scheme is an excessive simplification. Kyivan Rus was an early medieval East Slavic state with its centre in Kyiv. Modern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia inherit different elements of its culture, language, dynastic memory, religious tradition and political imagination in different ways. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines Kyivan Rus as the first East Slavic state, which reached its peak in the 11th century, with Kyiv as its main political and cultural centre.
The main problem begins when historical heritage becomes an instrument of political appropriation: when one modern nation declares itself the only legitimate heir to a complex medieval world and uses this as a basis for claims against its neighbours.
Myth 1. “Ukraine and Russia Are Brotherly Nations with a Single Historical Destiny”
Ukraine and Russia have partially overlapping historical roots, but after the decline of Kyivan Rus, their political, cultural and institutional development followed different paths. Therefore, the thesis of “one people” or of a natural “brotherly unity” is not an academic conclusion, but a political and ideological construction.
Kyivan Rus was a shared historical space for the East Slavs. However, after its feudal fragmentation and the Mongol invasion, different lands entered different political orbits: part of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the north-eastern principalities developed toward the Muscovite state. Britannica emphasises that the formation of the Kyivan state was connected with the Dnipro trade route and the strategic position of Kyiv, while the later history of the region developed through different political centres.
Conclusion
It is possible to speak of cultural proximity. But to speak of “one people” as an academic fact is incorrect.
Myth 2. “Russia Is the Direct and Sole Heir of Rus”
The name Rus initially referred to an early medieval political and cultural space centred in Kyiv. The Principality of Moscow emerged much later and only over time began to claim the heritage of Rus. The Russian Empire as an official state name was formalised in 1721, when Peter I adopted the title of emperor.
It is important to distinguish between three levels:
Rus — a medieval East Slavic state and cultural space.
Muscovy / the Muscovite state — a north-eastern political centre that became stronger in the 15th–16th centuries.
The Russian Empire — an imperial state officially established under Peter I in 1721.
Historian Serhii Plokhy, in his book Lost Kingdom, analyses how Russian rulers from Ivan III to Putin used the legacy of Rus to form imperial identity and territorial claims. The description of the book by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute emphasises that Plokhy’s work is devoted precisely to Russia’s search for a “lost kingdom” and to the problem of Russian-Ukrainian borders.
Conclusion
Russia is one of the heirs of the East Slavic historical space, but it is not its only or undisputed heir. The appropriation of the entire heritage of Rus as exclusively Russian history is an imperial narrative, not a neutral academic fact.
Myth 3. “The Russian Language Was the Original Language of All Rus, and Ukrainian Is Derived from It”
Modern Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian belong to the East Slavic language group. They share common ancient roots, but developed along different paths. Britannica states that the Ukrainian language is a lineal descendant of the spoken language used in Kyivan Rus between the 10th and 13th centuries. At the same time, Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian diverged significantly in the late Middle Ages, approximately from the late 13th to the 16th century.
Therefore, it is academically incorrect to claim that Ukrainian is “distorted Russian.” It is more accurate to say that Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian are related East Slavic languages that developed from a common East Slavic linguistic base, but under the influence of different political, cultural and contact environments.
Conclusion
Ukrainian is not a dialect of Russian. Both languages share a common East Slavic foundation, but Ukrainian has its own historical line of development.
Myth 4. “The Ancient Rus People Were the Same as the Modern Russian People”
The term “ancient Rus people” must be used with caution. In the Middle Ages, identities did not correspond to modern national categories. The inhabitants of Rus could identify themselves by principality, city, dynasty, religion, social group or land, but not in the sense of modern nations of the 19th–20th centuries.
Modern Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians formed as distinct peoples much later. Britannica directly states that Kyivan Rus is the cultural ancestor of all three East Slavic peoples, but this does not mean that medieval Rus is identical with modern Russia.
Conclusion
Equating the inhabitants of Kyivan Rus with modern Russians is an anachronism. It transfers modern national identity onto a medieval society.
Myth 5. “The Battle of Kulikovo Finally Liberated Rus from the Horde”
The Battle of Kulikovo occupies an important place in Russian historical memory, but its significance in later national mythology was greatly amplified. Even if one accepts the traditional dating and historicity of the battle, it did not mean the immediate liberation of Moscow from dependence on the Horde. The Muscovite state strengthened gradually, and the final end of dependence on the Horde is usually associated with the events of the late 15th century, particularly the reign of Ivan III.
Thus, the myth lies not necessarily in the fact of the battle itself, but in its interpretation as a one-time act of “national liberation.”
Conclusion
It is more academically accurate to say that the Battle of Kulikovo became an important symbol of Muscovite political memory, but it was not the immediate end of dependence on the Horde.
Myth 6. “Kyiv Is the Mother of Russian Cities, Therefore Kyiv Historically Belongs to Russia”
The phrase “Kyiv is the mother of Rus cities” belongs to the medieval context of Rus, not to the modern Russian Federation. Kyiv was indeed the main centre of Kyivan Rus, but using this chronicle formula for modern territorial claims is a political anachronism.
Britannica emphasises that Kyiv became the capital of Kyivan Rus after Oleg captured Kyiv in 882, and that Kyivan Rus became the main political and cultural centre of Eastern Europe in the 10th–11th centuries.
Conclusion
Kyiv’s historical importance for Rus does not prove any right of modern Russia to Kyiv. Medieval formulas cannot be used as arguments for modern borders.
Myth 7. “The History of Russia Begins in Kyiv”
The history of the East Slavic world does indeed include Kyivan Rus, but the history of the Muscovite state proper begins later — with the rise of Moscow as a political centre in the 14th–15th centuries. The Russian Empire as an official political form appears only in 1721.
This does not mean that Russia has no relation to the heritage of Rus. But it does mean that the history of Russia cannot simply “absorb” the history of Kyivan Rus, Ukraine and Belarus. Such a model was characteristic of imperial historiography, in which the centre of the empire appropriated the past of subordinate or neighbouring peoples.
Conclusion
The history of Russia is not identical to the history of Rus. Russia is one of the later heirs of the East Slavic world, but not its only subject.
Myth 8. “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign Proves a Single Ancient Rus Space under Russian Inheritance”
The Tale of Igor’s Campaign is an important monument of the East Slavic medieval literary tradition, but it cannot be used as proof of Russia’s exclusive inheritance of Rus. It belongs to the cultural world of Rus before the formation of modern nations.
The academic issue is that written monuments of Kyivan Rus and later Rus lands were often included in “Russian literature” within the Russian imperial tradition without taking into account the Ukrainian and Belarusian dimensions of this heritage.
Conclusion
The monuments of Rus should be considered part of a broader East Slavic and, in particular, Ukrainian-Belarusian-Russian medieval heritage, not as an exclusively Russian possession.
Myth 9. “Russia Gathered the Ukrainian Lands”
The thesis of “gathering lands” is a classic imperial narrative. It presents territorial expansion as the natural restoration of historical unity. In reality, Ukrainian lands at different times were under the rule of Lithuania, Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Muscovite state, the Russian Empire, the Austrian Empire, the USSR and other political entities.
After the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, relations between the Hetmanate and the Muscovite state became the subject of long historiographical debate. The Encyclopaedia of Ukraine emphasises that the original documents of the Pereiaslav Treaty have not survived, and that the nature of the agreement was legally and politically complex.
Later, the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667 divided Ukraine along the Dnipro: Russia received the eastern part of Ukraine, Kyiv and several territories. This shows that the issue was not “gathering”, but the geopolitical division of Ukrainian lands between neighbouring powers.
Conclusion
“Gathering lands” is an ideological formula that conceals wars, treaties, partitions, protectorates and the gradual restriction of Ukrainian autonomy.
Myth 10. “Ukraine Means Borderland, and the Word Appeared Late”
The name Ukraine has a medieval written history. One of the earliest known mentions dates to 1187 in the Kyiv Chronicle according to the Hypatian Codex. The Encyclopaedia of Ukraine states that the Kyiv Chronicle covers the period 1118–1200 and was compiled in Kyiv on the basis of princely, monastic and family chronicles.
Harvard Ukrainian Studies also examines the history of the Ukrainian national name as a process of long semantic and political development, not as an “invention of the 19th century.”
Conclusion
The word “Ukraine” is not an artificial invention of the 19th century. It has medieval written attestations and over time became a national name.
Myth 11. “Ancient Rus Bylinas Are Exclusively Russian Heritage”The epic tradition of the bylinas formed within the medieval East Slavic cultural space, but it was later recorded, edited and interpreted under the conditions of the Russian Empire. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between:
- the medieval narrative layer;
- the place of later recording;
- the imperial editorial and school interpretation.
If the bylinas feature Kyiv, Prince Volodymyr, Chernihiv and other southern Rus centres, this shows the connection of a significant part of the epic tradition with the world of Kyivan Rus. However, late recording in the northern regions of the Russian Empire allowed Russian historiography to present this epic tradition as exclusively Russian.
Conclusion
Bylinas are part of a broader East Slavic heritage. They cannot be reduced solely to the Russian cultural tradition.
Myth 12. “The Three Bogatyrs Are Russian Heroes”
Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich belong to the epic world associated with Kyivan Rus (Ukraine) and Prince Volodymyr, but not Russia at all. In the late Russian Empire, these figures were incorporated into the Russian national canon, including through literature, painting and school culture.
It is more academically accurate to say that these images have a complex origin: they are connected with the Kyivan epic cycle, but were later reinterpreted within the Russian cultural tradition.
Conclusion
Appropriating the bogatyrs exclusively into Russian history is an oversimplification. Their primary epic context is connected with Kyivan Rus.
Myth 13. “The Pereiaslav Council Was the Reunification of Ukraine and Russia”
The Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 was not a “reunification of two brotherly peoples,” but a military-political agreement between the Hetmanate and the Tsardom of Moscow during Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Britannica describes the Pereiaslav Agreement as an act by which the Cossack council accepted Muscovite protection, which led to war between Russia and Poland over control of Ukraine.
The Encyclopaedia of Ukraine emphasises that the original documents have not survived, and that surviving translations and drafts do not allow the agreement to be reduced to the simple formula of “reunification.”
Conclusion
The formula “reunification of Ukraine with Russia” is a later imperial and Soviet interpretation. Historically, it is more accurate to speak of a military-political alliance that over time led to the restriction of Ukrainian autonomy.
Myth 14. “The Volga Is an Originally Russian River”
The Volga region was historically a multiethnic region connected with the Volga Bulgars, Tatars, Finno-Ugric peoples and other groups. The representation of the Volga as an exclusively “Russian river” is the result of the later imperial integration of the region into the Muscovite and then Russian state.
Conclusion
The Volga is part of the history of many peoples. Presenting it as an exclusively Russian space is a nationalising myth.
Myth 15. “The Russian Lands Have an Obvious Ethnogeographic Core That Includes Ukraine and Belarus”
The ethnogeographic history of Eastern Europe is complex. The lands of modern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were formed from different tribal, princely, religious, linguistic and political traditions. The claim that Ukraine and Belarus are “parts of historical Russia” is the result of an imperial model in which different East Slavic peoples were included in a single “all-Russian” scheme.
Britannica states that the East Slavic languages are Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. This reflects kinship, but not the identity of these peoples and cultures.
Conclusion
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia share a common East Slavic layer, but have different historical trajectories. Common origin does not mean political unity.
Myth 16. “The Great Russian People as a Single Historical Community”
Russian identity developed as an imperial and multiethnic identity. It incorporated Slavic, Finno-Ugric, Turkic, Siberian, Caucasian and other elements. Therefore, the term “Russian people” in a historical context often mixes ethnic, linguistic, religious, state and imperial dimensions.
Serfdom played a special role in Russian social history. It was abolished only in 1861 under Alexander II. Britannica states that the Emancipation Manifesto granted serfs personal freedom, but the process of acquiring land was complex, expensive and extended over time.
Conclusion
Russian identity historically developed not as purely ethnic, but as imperial and multinational. Therefore, it cannot be used as simple proof of a “single ancient nation.”
Myth 17. “The Mysterious Russian Soul”
The concept of the “Russian soul” belongs more to literature, philosophy and cultural self-reflection than to strict historical science. It became part of a cultural myth in the 19th century, especially in the context of Russian literature, religious philosophy and the opposition between Russia and the West.
From an academic point of view, such concepts require deconstruction: they do not describe the objective essence of a people, but express a cultural self-portrait created by intellectuals, writers, theologians and ideologues.
Conclusion
The “Russian soul” is a cultural myth, not an academic category.
Myth 18. “Orthodoxy Is an Originally Russian Religion”
The Christianisation of Rus is primarily connected with Kyiv and Prince Volodymyr. It was Kyivan Rus that adopted Christianity at the end of the 10th century, long before the formation of the Muscovite state as an independent centre. Therefore, the claim that Orthodoxy was originally a “Russian” religion is an anachronism.
At the same time, the original claim that the Russian Orthodox Church “has no autocephaly” requires correction. From the standpoint of the modern church map, the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the largest autocephalous Orthodox churches, as Britannica directly states.
However, in 2019 the Ecumenical Patriarchate granted a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which became an important stage in the separation of the Ukrainian church structure from Moscow’s influence. The official website of the Ecumenical Patriarchate publishes the text of the 2019 Tomos, and Britannica states that in January 2019 the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was created and recognised by Constantinople.
Conclusion
The Orthodox tradition of the Eastern Slavs historically begins with Kyiv, but the modern church map is complex. The Russian Orthodox Church is an autocephalous church, while the 2019 Tomos concerns the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
Myth 19. “Russia’s Wealth Belongs to the Russian People”
The Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation have controlled and still control vast natural resources located in regions inhabited by different peoples. The question of who owns resource rent is not only economic, but also political and legal.
The academically correct formulation of the question should be: how fairly are revenues from natural resources distributed among the centre, the regions, indigenous peoples and local populations? This is a question of federalism, property rights, tax policy and the rights of indigenous peoples.
Conclusion
The myth lies in the idea that the presence of natural resources automatically means the prosperity of the people. In practice, resource wealth can strengthen the centre, elites and security apparatus without creating fair regional development.
Myth 20. “Russia Is an Ancient State, While Ukraine Appeared Only in 1991”
The modern Ukrainian state did indeed restore its independence in 1991, but the Ukrainian historical tradition is much older than modern statehood. It includes Kyivan Rus, the Galician-Volhynian Principality, the Lithuanian-Rus legal and chancellery tradition, the Cossacks, the Hetmanate, the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk, the national movement of the 19th century, the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 and the dissident movement of the 20th century.
The Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk of 1710 is an important monument of Ukrainian political and legal thought of the early 18th century. The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute describes it as one of the significant documents of the Ukrainian constitutional tradition, and the Encyclopaedia of Ukraine states that Orlyk was the principal author of the Bendery Constitution.
The name “Ukraine” has written attestations from the 12th century and did not appear in 1991.
Conclusion
Ukrainian statehood in its modern form emerged in 1991, but the Ukrainian historical and political tradition has a centuries-long depth.
Main Academic Conclusion
The historical dispute between Ukrainian and Russian traditions concerns not only the past, but also the right to subjectivity. Russian imperial historiography sought to present Kyivan Rus as the beginning of Russian history and Ukraine as a secondary, regional or late phenomenon. Modern historical scholarship offers a more complex picture:
Kyivan Rus was a medieval East Slavic state with its centre in Kyiv. Ukraine, Belarus and Russia inherit its traditions in different ways, but none of them has a monopoly on the entire heritage of Rus.
At the same time, Ukraine has a direct territorial and cultural-historical connection with Kyiv as the centre of Rus. Therefore, attempts to deny Ukrainian historical subjectivity are not an academic position, but a continuation of an imperial political narrative.
The Russian historical myth is built on the idea of continuity from Kyivan Rus to modern Russia. However, academic history shows a more complex picture: Rus was a multi-centred medieval world; Kyiv was its main early centre; the Muscovite state formed later; and the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian traditions developed along different paths. Therefore, the appropriation of the entire history of Rus by one modern state is not an academic fact, but a political instrument of imperial identity.
