The Demilitarisation of Transnistria: International Law, Ukrainian Strategic Necessity, and Moldovan Sovereignty

A Frozen Conflict in a Hot War

The Transnistrian region, a narrow strip of land between the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border, has functioned as a "frozen conflict" zone since 1992. However, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has fundamentally altered the geopolitical calculus. What was once a local diplomatic dispute is now a critical security threat to Southern Ukraine and the stability of South-Eastern Europe.

From the perspective of international law and the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, the potential for Ukrainian involvement in the demilitarisation of this region is not merely a military hypothetical, but a legally grounded pathway to regional stability.

1. The Legal Foundation: Sovereignty as an Absolute

The primary pillar of any analysis regarding Transnistria is the status of the territory under international law. The so-called "Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic" (PMR) is a legal nullity.

• Non-Recognition: Not a single UN member state—including the Russian Federation itself—officially recognises Transnistria as an independent state. Legally, every square inch of the region is the sovereign territory of the Republic of Moldova.
• The Principle of Consent: Under the UN Charter and the principles of state sovereignty, any foreign military action on Moldovan soil is contingent upon the explicit consent of the legitimate government in Chișinău.
• The Zelenskyy Doctrine: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has consistently maintained a disciplined legal stance. He has clarified that while the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) possess the capability to neutralise threats in Transnistria, they will only act upon an official request from the Moldovan authorities. This "invitation-only" approach ensures that any action remains within the bounds of international law, contrasting sharply with Russian unilateralism.

2. The Illegal Russian Military Presence

The presence of Russian troops in Transnistria is categorised into two distinct, yet equally problematic, groups:

1. The Operative Group of Russian Forces (OGRF): This unit is the successor to the Soviet 14th Guards Army. Unlike "peacekeepers," the OGRF has no international mandate and no bilateral agreement with Moldova to justify its presence.
2. Russian Peacekeepers: While established under the 1992 ceasefire agreement, Moldova has long argued that the mission has outlived its purpose and should be replaced by a civilian international mission.

International Legal Condemnation: The illegality of this presence is documented in several high-level international instruments:

• UN General Assembly Resolution 72/282 (2018): This resolution explicitly calls for the "complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova."
• PACE Resolution 2433 (2022): The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe officially designated Transnistria as a "zone of Russian occupation." This is a critical distinction; it shifts the narrative from an internal civil dispute to an ongoing act of external aggression against Moldova.
• 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit: Russia formally committed to withdrawing its forces and ammunition by 2002—a promise that remains unfulfilled more than two decades later.

3. The Arsenal at Cobasna: Europe’s Ticking Time Bomb

The strategic "gravity" of Transnistria lies in the village of Cobasna, located just 2 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. This site hosts the largest ammunition depot in Eastern Europe, a relic of the Cold War.

Estimated Quantities and Types of Armament: According to data from the OSCE, intelligence reports, and the Moldovan Academy of Sciences, the depot contains approximately 20,000 tonnes of ammunition. To put this in perspective, this would fill roughly 2,500 to 3,000 railway wagons.

The inventory includes:

• Artillery Shells: Thousands of 122mm and 152mm rounds, which are the primary calibres used in the current war in Ukraine.
• Rocket Artillery: Significant stocks of Grad (122mm) rockets.
• Small Arms & Mortars: Hundreds of thousands of grenades, mortar bombs, and millions of rounds of small arms ammunition.
• Legacy Equipment: Stocks of older anti-tank missiles and aerial bombs.

The Condition of the Arsenal: Experts estimate that 57% to 65% of this ammunition is obsolete, having exceeded its shelf life. This creates a dual-threat scenario:

• Military Threat: The functional portion of the arsenal could be used by Russian or Transnistrian forces to attack Ukraine's rear.
• Environmental/Technogenic Threat: The Academy of Sciences of Moldova has warned that an accidental or intentional detonation of the Cobasna depot would release energy equivalent to 10 kilotonnes—comparable to the Hiroshima atomic bomb. Such an event would cause a disaster radius of 50–100km, devastating both Moldovan and Ukrainian border towns.

Technogenic Risks and Infrastructural Degradation

To fully grasp the magnitude of the threat, one must consider not only the tonnage but also the physical storage conditions of the Cobasna arsenal. These depots were established as far back as the 1940s, and their current infrastructure fails to meet modern safety and security standards.

Key Risk Factors:

• Chemical Degradation: Over 60% of the ammunition was manufactured between the 1950s and 1970s. The natural decomposition of propellants and explosive fillers (such as picric acid and TNT) renders these shells extremely sensitive to temperature fluctuations and mechanical shock.
• Storage Density: Unlike modern dispersed facilities, Cobasna features a dense concentration of hangars. This creates a high risk of a 'cascade effect', where a detonation in one sector triggers a near-instantaneous chain reaction across the entire perimeter.
• Visual Scale: To visually assess the sheer scale of the largest ammunition depot in Eastern Europe and understand the complexity of its demilitarisation, it is essential to review documented footage and analytical overviews of the site.

Recommended Viewing: The following report provides a detailed look at the internal layout and vast scale of the depots, offering a clear perspective on the genuine technogenic threat posed to the region.

 

This footage confirms that the Cobasna arsenal is not merely a storage site, but a critical hazard requiring urgent international oversight and the deployment of professional EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) units to prevent a regional catastrophe.

 

4. The Socio-Political Landscape: Moods and "Sheriff" Hegemony

The internal atmosphere in Transnistria as of 2025 is defined not by ideological fervour, but by a precarious balancing act between Moscow’s rhetoric and European economic reality.

• The Pragmatism of the "Sheriff" Holding: The region is effectively a corporate fiefdom of the Sheriff holding company. While historically pro-Russian, the company’s interests have shifted. Today, over 70% of Transnistrian exports are destined for the European Union, while trade with Russia has collapsed due to logistical isolation. The local oligarchs are keenly aware that a conflict with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) would liquidate their assets. Consequently, the local elite is more likely to negotiate a "controlled surrender" or reintegration than to fight a scorched-earth war for the Kremlin.
• A Multi-Passport Population: The vast majority of the 460,000 residents hold multiple citizenships. With nearly 350,000 Moldovan passports issued in the region, alongside thousands of Ukrainian and Russian ones, the population is highly mobile. Recent surveys indicate a growing "fatigue of isolation." While older generations remain susceptible to Russian television, the younger and economically active population increasingly views Moldova’s EU path as their only viable future.
• Potential for Resistance: The "Transnistrian Armed Forces" (approx. 5,000–7,500 personnel) are largely composed of locals who serve for a salary, not for an ideology. Military analysts suggest that in the event of a joint Moldovan-Ukrainian operation, the rate of desertion would be high. Real resistance would likely be limited to the Russian OGRF and hardline "veterans" groups, rather than the general population.

5. Projected Russian Responses: The Analyst’s View

European and Ukrainian strategic analysts (including ISW and various EU security think-tanks) agree that Russia’s "military toolbox" in Transnistria is severely limited by geography.

Scenario A: The Hybrid Destabilisation (Most Likely) Unable to send reinforcements due to the closure of Ukrainian and Romanian airspace, Moscow would likely activate "Plan B" in Chișinău. This involves:

• Organising mass protests via pro-Russian proxy parties.
• Intense cyber-attacks on Moldovan state infrastructure.
• A "False Flag" operation in the region to justify a political (though not physical) intervention.

Scenario B: The Energy Blackout Russia’s most potent weapon remains the gas valve. By cutting off the supply to the Cuciurgan power plant, Moscow could plunge both banks of the Dniester into darkness. However, in 2025, Moldova is better connected to the Romanian and European grids than ever before, blunting the impact of this blackmail.

Scenario C: Strategic "Scorched Earth" A high-risk scenario involves Russia attempting to remotely detonate the Cobasna depot or using cruise missiles to destroy the arsenal before the AFU can secure it. This would be a desperate move intended to create a humanitarian and environmental crisis that would stall any military advance.

6. The Legal Mirage of "Ownership"

A common Russian narrative is that the Cobasna arsenal is "sovereign Russian property." Legally, this is a fallacy:

• The Vacuum of Agreements: There is no valid bilateral treaty between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation that permits the storage of these weapons.
• Status of the Property: While the hardware originated from the Soviet 14th Army, international law dictates that illegal property on sovereign soil—especially when placed there in violation of withdrawal commitments (Istanbul 1999)—loses its diplomatic protection. Moldova has the right to treat these stocks as "hazardous abandoned property" and delegate its disposal to a third party (Ukraine).

7. The Roadmap for Demilitarisation (Technical Proposal)

To avoid a "hot" conflict, a phased transition is necessary:

1. Diplomatic Pre-emption: Moldova and Ukraine sign a "Security Cooperation Protocol," officially requesting Ukrainian technical assistance for the "neutralisation of technogenic threats" at Cobasna.
2. The "Corridor of Repatriation": Russia is offered a 72-hour window to evacuate OGRF personnel (without equipment) via a monitored corridor to a neutral third country or back to Russia.
3. Active Inventory & Transfer: * Functional Stocks: 122mm/152mm shells are inventoried by a joint commission and transferred to the AFU as "payment for security services" or under a long-term lease-purchase agreement with Moldova.   
• Obsolete Stocks: Mobile industrial incinerators (supplied by EU partners) are deployed to neutralize the 60% of ammunition that is too unstable to move.
4. Civilian Reintegration: The Russian "peacekeepers" are replaced by an international policing mission (e.g., EU-led), focusing on border control and public safety during the transition to Moldovan law.

Summary

The demilitarisation of Transnistria is not an act of aggression, but an act of regional hygiene. It is the closing of a 30-year-old loophole that Russia has used to hold Moldova hostage and threaten Ukraine’s southern flank. With the legal consent of Chișinău and the military capability of Kyiv, the "Transnistrian problem" can be solved through a combination of legal precision and strategic resolve.