Zaluzhnyi: “Our allies must deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine as a security guarantee.”

Nuclear Shadows Over Ukraine: From the Budapest Memorandum to Calls for Allied Deterrence

When Valerii Zaluzhnyi publicly argued that Ukraine’s allies should deploy nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory as a security guarantee, it was not just a provocative soundbite. It was the latest expression of a long, painful story: a country that once held one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, gave it up under pressure and promises — and was then invaded by one of the guarantors.

To understand why such a statement can now be voiced by a senior Ukrainian statesman, we have to go back to the early 1990s.

Ukraine: Once the World’s Third-Largest Nuclear Power

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine did not start its independent life as a “normal” non-nuclear state. It suddenly found itself sitting on a huge part of the Soviet strategic arsenal:

• Around 130 UR-100N (SS-19) ICBMs with six warheads each

• 46 RT-23 Molodets (SS-24) ICBMs with ten warheads each

• 33 heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles

• In total, roughly 1,700 nuclear warheads on its territory

That made Ukraine, the third-largest nuclear power in the world, behind only russia and the United States. It held about one-third of the former Soviet strategic arsenal.

If we compare numbers from the early 1990s, this stockpile exceeded the combined arsenals of China, France and the United Kingdom at that time. Back then, those three powers together were estimated to possess several hundred warheads, while Ukraine hosted roughly 1,700.

In Soviet times, the USSR maintained a full nuclear triad – land-based missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines. After independence, Ukraine physically hosted the land-based ICBMs and strategic bombers and inherited substantial design and production capacity, though operational control over the submarine leg remained with russia. Still, in terms of warheads and delivery systems on its soil, Ukraine’s position was closer to a major nuclear power than to today’s “non-nuclear” image.

The Budapest Memorandum: Disarmament in Exchange for “Assurances”

However, the newly independent Ukraine never gained full operational control over those weapons. Launch codes and central command stayed in Moscow. Washington, Moscow and European capitals were united on one key point: they did not want a new nuclear state to emerge from the Soviet breakup.

U.S. and russian policy in the early 1990s had a clear goal:

• keep Russia as the only nuclear-armed successor to the USSR;

• persuade (and pressure) Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up their nuclear inheritance.

After years of negotiations, Ukraine agreed. On 5 December 1994, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, along with the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. In essence:

• Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

• It agreed to transfer its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement.

• In return, the U.S., U.K. and russia “assured” Ukraine’s sovereignty and existing borders, promising to refrain from the use or threat of force and from economic coercion.

The wording was deliberately weaker than a formal security guarantee like NATO’s Article 5; the English word “assurances” was often translated domestically in a way that sounded closer to “guarantees,” creating expectations in Ukraine that were never truly matched by the legal text.

By 1996, the last nuclear warheads had left Ukrainian territory. Kyiv received financial compensation and fuel for nuclear power plants — but gave up the ultimate deterrent.

From Paper Assurances to Tanks at the Border

Two decades later, those assurances were shattered.

• In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and began its war in Donbas, directly violating the spirit and letter of the Budapest Memorandum.

• In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attempting to overthrow the government in Kyiv and seize large parts of the country.

The response from the other signatories, while substantial in economic aid and weapon deliveries, did not include direct military intervention or the kind of iron-clad defence commitment that many Ukrainians had imagined in the 1990s.

For many in Ukraine – across the political spectrum – the lesson seems brutally simple:

A nuclear state that gave up its arsenal on the basis of great-power promises was later attacked by one of those very powers.

This is the psychological and political backdrop to Zaluzhnyi’s statement.

What Does “Deploying Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine” Actually Mean?

When Zaluzhnyi says that “our allies must deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine as a security guarantee”, he is not proposing that Ukraine build its own nuclear arsenal from scratch. Rather, his words echo other debates now happening across Europe and Asia about:

• Nuclear sharing (as NATO has long practiced), and

• The credibility of extended deterrence – the U.S. and, potentially, U.K. and French nuclear umbrellas.

Under NATO’s existing nuclear-sharing arrangements, for example:

• U.S. nuclear bombs are deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

• They remain under U.S. control, but are intended to be delivered by allied aircraft in wartime.

• This arrangement is meant to tie allies closer together and share both risk and responsibility.

Zaluzhnyi’s idea, if taken literally, would imply something similar on Ukrainian soil: allied nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, controlled by the providing state but visibly present as a tripwire and a symbol of irreversible commitment.

At a minimum, his comment pushes the Overton window: it signals that in Kyiv’s view, classic “assurances” on paper are no longer enough – only tangible, hard security measures will be taken seriously after Budapest’s failure.

The Arguments For – and Against – Nuclear Deployment in Ukraine

Arguments in Favour

From the perspective of those who support Zaluzhnyi’s logic, several arguments stand out:

1. Restoring Credibility After Budapest
   Ukraine paid the highest possible price for nuclear disarmament and received aggression instead of protection. A visible nuclear presence by allies would be seen as a corrective to that historic injustice and a signal that great powers cannot break their promises without consequences.

2. Deterring Further russian Escalation
   Russia has repeatedly used nuclear rhetoric and now deploys nuclear weapons in Belarus, closer to NATO’s borders.
   Stationing allied nuclear weapons in Ukraine, supporters argue, could restore strategic symmetry and make any additional russian move far more dangerous for Moscow.

3. Aligning with Emerging European Thinking
   Debates about stronger European nuclear deterrence are already happening in Germany, Poland and other states, amid doubts about long-term U.S. commitment.
   In that larger context, Ukraine — the main battlefield of European security today — could be seen as a logical location for some form of enhanced nuclear deterrence posture.

Arguments Against

Yet there are also serious counterarguments:

1. Risk of Escalation
   Placing nuclear weapons on the front line of a hot war could sharply increase tensions and crisis instability, making miscalculation more likely.

2. Non-Proliferation Norms and the NPT
   Even if weapons were owned and controlled by allies, deploying them in a non-NATO, non-nuclear state at war would raise profound questions for the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, already under strain.

3. Targeting and Vulnerability
   Nuclear storage sites in Ukraine would immediately become priority targets for Russian missiles and sabotage. Some analysts argue that deterrence can be provided more safely from submarines and aircraft based outside Ukraine.

4. Political Unity in the West
   Many Western governments, facing strong anti-nuclear public opinion, may be unwilling to take such a dramatic step. Even within NATO, current nuclear sharing is contentious; extending it into an active warzone would be far more controversial.

Beyond Nuclear Weapons: What Kind of Security Guarantee Does Ukraine Need?

Whether or not Zaluzhnyi’s specific proposal ever becomes a real policy option, it highlights a deeper issue: what does a meaningful security guarantee for Ukraine actually look like?

Several broad models are being debated:

• Full NATO membership with Article 5 protection — classic collective defence, backed by U.S., U.K. and French nuclear arsenals.

• A “NATO-like” treaty with a smaller group of key allies, if formal NATO enlargement is blocked.

• Stronger bilateral defence agreements combined with long-term military aid and deployment of conventional forces.

• Some form of nuclear sharing or nuclear umbrella clarification, short of stationing weapons in Ukraine but clearly signalling that any large-scale attack would face the full weight of allied deterrence.

What unites these debates is the almost universal consensus in Ukraine that Budapest-style assurances are dead. Vague promises on paper, without hard means of enforcement, are no longer seen as acceptable after 2014 and 2022.

A Country That Gave Up the Bomb – and Refuses to Give Up on Security

Ukraine is in a uniquely bitter position:

• It once possessed a nuclear arsenal larger than those of China, France and the United Kingdom combined.

• It disarmed in the name of global non-proliferation and European peace.

• It was then attacked by a nuclear power that co-signed its security assurances.

In that light, Zaluzhnyi’s call for the deployment of allied nuclear weapons in Ukraine is less a literal policy blueprint and more a stark political message:

If the world wants Ukraine to remain non-nuclear, then the world must offer security guarantees that are as serious, as concrete and as irreversible as the arsenal Ukraine once gave up.

How exactly that will be achieved remains an open question. But after Budapest and two Russian invasions, one thing is clear: Ukrainians will not accept a future built only on promises that can be broken.